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NONREFUNDABLE RETAINERS REVISITED
LE T R BRicKMAN* & LAWRENCE A. CUNNiNGHAM**
Amidst widespread public attention to fee abuses, a court
recently held for the first time that nonrefundable retainers vio-
late professional ethics. The court in In re Cooperman essentially
adopted the argument of Professors Brickman and Cunningham
that nonrefundable retainers are against public policy because
they impair a client's right to discharge his attorney at any time
without penalty. Because declaring such agreements unethical is
tantamount, in the eyes of the practicing bar, to declaring them
void, In re Cooperman has sparked a national outcry from those
who profit from enforcing nonrefundable retainers.
In this Article, Professors Brickman and Cunningham ana-
lyze the recent judicial adoption of their ethical argument. The
authors first distinguish the many different categories of retainer
agreements, confusion of which has led critics of Cooperman to
misinterpret the court's holding. The Article then clarifies some
confusing aspects of the Cooperman opinion itself. The authors
conclude that future courts, in addition to declaring nonrefund-
able retainers unethical, should order restitution to the injured
client, a remedy that the Cooperman court declined to provide.
Various groups with vested interests in nonrefundable retainers
assert their own particular justifications for such agreements, and
the authors consider each argument in turn. They conclude that
no proffered rationale for nonrefundable retainers is tenable be-
cause none can avoid violating the client discharge right. The
authors propose an ethical rule banning nonrefundable retainers.
They believe such a rule would both clarify exactly what consti-
tutes a nonrefundable retainer as well as foreclose the possibility
of drafting agreements that could escape the application of judi-
cial bans like Cooperman. Finally, the Article explains why the
client discharge right, as reinvigorated in Cooperman, implicates
and should control other aspects of the attorney-client relation-
ship as well.
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fee abuses by lawyers have generated considerable publicity and sharp
scrutiny in recent years.' One of the more controversial fee abuses is the
1. E.g., Edward A. Adams, Bankruptcy Fees Here Are Highest in Nation-Studies: Billing
Rates Higher, Proceedings Take Longer Here, N.Y. LJ., June 24, 1993, at 1 (stating that attor-
neys' fees for bankruptcies in the Southern District of New York are the highest in the nation);
Lester Brickman, Lawyers' Fee Frenzy, WASH. PosT, Aug. 16, 1991, at A29 (proposing required
disclosure of legal fees in asbestos-related product liability actions); Tom Furlong, Many Firms
Don't Survive Filings for Bankruptcy; Commerce: The Process in the Southland is the Most
Expensive and Least Successful in the Nation, L.A. TIas, Jan. 13, 1992, at Al (stating that
excessive attorney fees decrease chances that bankrupt companies will successfully emerge from a
Chapter 11 reorganization); Denise Gellene, Bar Probing Lawyers' Fees for Entries in Visa Lot-
tery, L.A. Trms, Mar. 7, 1991, at D6 (reporting that immigration lawyers charge excessive fees
for entering people in State Department visa lotteries); James S. Granelli, Briefcase: Banking;
Legal Fees Still Adding to Taxpayer Pain From Lincoln Savings Fiasco, L.A. TIMs, Apr. 2,
1993, at D5 (stating that large legal fees incurred for the revitalization of failed savings and loans
will be passed on to the public in the form of increased taxes); Wayne E. Green, Legal Fees
Rankle Corporate Customers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1990, at BI (reporting that corporations are
cutting back on their employment of outside counsel because of enormous fees being charged);
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nonrefundable retainer-a fee paid by a client in advance of services and
denominated by the lawyer as nonrefundable, irrespective of whether the
client discontinues the representation or whether the lawyer does any work.
Indeed, such retainers, which are routinely used by matrimonial, criminal
defense, and bankruptcy attorneys,2 have recently emerged from beneath a
low-visibility veneer to become an important national public policy issue.
We analyzed the legal and ethical validity of these widely used but
controversial agreements in an article published five years ago.4 Since
then, two judicial decisions have adopted our arguments and held such
agreements unlawful' and unethical.6 The more recent decision, In re
Linda Himelstein, The Verdict: Guilty of Overcharging, Bus. WK., Sept. 6, 1993, at 62 (discuss-
ing steps taken by corporations to reduce excessive attorneys' fees); Douglas Jehl, Administration
Calls for Wide Legal Reforms, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al (discussing former Vice Presi-
dent Quayle's proposal to adopt rule governing legal fees under which losing litigants pay win-
ners' attorneys' fees); Steven L. Myers, Cuomo Promotes Changes In Product Liability Laws,
N.Y. Tavms, Apr. 9, 1993, at B6 (discussing New York Governor Cuomo's proposal to limit legal
fees significantly in virtually all cases in which contingent fees are used); Suzanne L. Oliver &
Leslie Spencer, Who Will the Monster Devour Next, FoRBEs, Feb. 18, 1991, at 75 (reporting that
huge legal fees and overzealous attorneys have driven many asbestos manufacturers into bank-
ruptcy); Leslie Spencer, Are Contingency Fees Legal?, FoPBns, Feb. 19, 1990, at 130 (stating that
contingency fee percentages and profits taken by plaintiffs' lawyers are unreasonably high); Cath-
erine Yang, Will the Clintons Take a Scalpel to Legal Fees?, Bus. WK., Apr. 5, 1993, at 66
(discussing a proposal by President Clinton's health care task force to limit legal fees in certain
medical malpractice actions).
2. See Lester Brickman & Jonathan Klein, The Use of Advance Fee Attorney Retainer
Agreements in Bankruptcy: Another Special Law for Lawyers?, 43 S.C. L. REv. 1037, 1068
(1992); see infra notes 39 and 86.
3. E.g., Edward A. Adams, Non-Refundable Fee Agreements Banned; Wide Impact Seen of
Disciplinary Ruling, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 1993, at 4; Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Clarification Offered on Lawyers' Retainers (Letter to the Editor), N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1, 1993, at 2;
Stephen Gillers, All Non-Refundable Fee Agreements are Not Created Equal, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3,
1993, at 1; Gerald E. Harper, Are Non-Refundable Retainer Agreements Unethical?, 1 LAW. LIA-
BmTY ALERT 63 (1993); Frederick Miller, Hypotheticals Called Wanting in Defense (Letter to the
Editor), N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1993, at 2; Cornelia H. Tuite, Retainers v. Advance Payments: Either
Way, You Have to Earn It, Cm. DAiLY L. BuLL., Mar. 5, 1993, at 6; Junda Woo, Nonrefundable
Lawyers' Fees Barred By New York State Court as Unethical, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1993, at B10.
We have participated in and attended conferences concerning nonrefundable retainers and have
been informed that such retainers are the subject of considerable attention from lawyers across the
country. See Randall Samborn, Lawyer Discipline to Open Up, NAT'L L.J., June 7, 1993, at 3, 36
(reporting on the American Bar Association's 19th National Conference on Professional Respon-
sibility and the interest of conference participants in a draft of this Article).
4. Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible
Under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. Rv. 149 (1988).
5. Joel R. Brandes, P.C. v. Zingmond, 573 N.Y.S.2d 579,581-86 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (following
the arguments contained in Brickman and Cunningham, supra note 4, at 176-88, and holding
nonrefundable retainer agreements invalid as a matter of contract law). This Article is limited to a
discussion of the ethical implications of nonrefundable retainers. For the contract law analysis
adopted in Brandes, see Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 176-89.
6. In re Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855, 856-59 (App. Div. 1993) (following the arguments
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Cooperman,7 is the first judicial opinion in the country to invalidate
nonrefundable retainers as unethical. Because nonrefundable retainers are
in such widespread use, the decision has produced a national outcry.8 At
present, the decision is being appealed;9 many parties are eagerly seeking to
participate as amicus curiae.10
The Cooperman court adopted our assessment of nonrefundable retain-
ers: 11 such retainers are unethical because they effectively deprive a client
of the right, granted in early case law and recognized by the majority of
states, to discharge a lawyer with or without cause, at any time, without
penalty.' 2 Cooperman is not eritirely self-explanatory, however, and is sub-
contained in Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 153-69, and holding nonrefundable re-
tainer agreements impermissible and unenforceable as a matter of legal ethics).
7. 591 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 1993). Cooperman was soon followed by Hegeman-Harris
Co. v. Town of Greenburgh, N.Y. L., Mar. 25, 1993, at 25, 34 (Sup. Ct. 1993), in which a lower
New York court, citing and following Cooperman, set aside a nonrefundable retainer as "illegal
and void."
8. See supra note 3.
9. The attorney's motion to reargue the case in the Second Department was denied on May
25, 1993; his motion for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was granted on
September 14, 1993. The last time the New York Court of Appeals had an opportunity to examine
the validity of a nonrefundable retainer agreement, that court studiously avoided doing so (instead
disposing of the issue by deciding that the agreement before it was unenforceable on the grounds
of ambiguity). Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857 (citing Jacobson v. Sassower, 489 N.E.2d 1283
(N.Y. 1985)). For a detailed and critical analysis of Jacobson v. Sassower, see Brickman & Cun-
ningham, supra note 4, at 166-70.
10. E.g., Joint Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae NYSACDL and NACDL in Support
of Respondent's Motion for Reargument, Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855 (No. 90-00429) [herein-
after NYSACDL Brief] (brief of New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers supporting motion for reargument by Mr.
Cooperman); Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Criminal Courts Bar Association of Nassau
County in Support of Petitioner's Motion to Reargue, Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855 (No.
90-00429) (brief supporting motion for reargument by Mr. Cooperman); Brief of Amicus Curiae
New York State Bar Association in Support of Permission to Appeal [sic], Cooperman, 591
N.Y.S.2d 855 (No. 90-00429) [hereinafter N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Brief]; cf. Gillers, supra note 3,
at 3 (criticizing the Cooperman court by claiming it decided more than was required, particularly
since the initial proceeding in disciplinary actions cannot benefit from amici briefs because that
initial proceeding is confidential).
11. See ABA/BNA LAwYERS' MANUAL ON PROFEssIONAL CoNDucr, No. 131, 45:109-11
(American Bar Association ed., 1993) ("Cooperman in effect adopts the argument in Briclkman &
Cunningham," supra note 4). The staff attorney of the Grievance Committee that successfully
brought the disciplinary proceeding in Cooperman has indicated to the authors that the Grievance
Committee's arguments were drawn directly from Bricknan & Cunningham, supra note 4. See
Letter from Robert P. Guido to Lester Brickman and Lawrence A. Cunningham (Mar. 4, 1993)
(copy on file with the authors and the North Carolina Law Review).
12. Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916); see infra note 24. A committee appointed by
the chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals to examine the role of attorneys in matrimonial
actions has also embraced this policy in its recommendation to that court to adopt, among other
things, a court rule prohibiting nonrefundable retainers. REPORT OF Tum CoMMrrrnm TO ExMIxmm
LAWYER CoNDucr IN MArIuMoLuAL AcnONS 18 (May 4, 1993) [hereinafter MATRIMONIAL COM.
MrrnE] ("[Tio preserve the client's unqualified right to discharge counsel, even without cause,
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ject to misinterpretation. 3 Because the opinion is destined to have a na-
tional impact and because of the national attention it has received, we think
it is important to put Cooperman in -context and clarify its implications.
Part II of this Article introduces the law and policy of retainer agree-
ments, distinguishing between special retainer agreements, which contem-
plate fees for specified services, and general retainer agreements, which
contemplate fees for availability to render specified or unspecified services.
Part II then defines nonrefundable retainer agreements, which are special
retainers, paid in advance of specified services to be rendered, with the
advance fee denominated by the lawyer as nonrefundable under any circum-
stances (even if the lawyer does not do the work contemplated). In contrast,
general retainers are not nonrefundable retainers (and therefore were not at
issue in Cooperman); rather, they are fees paid solely for availability and
therefore do not involve an advance fee but a fee that is fully earned when
paid.' 4 Part II concludes with a discussion of some of the public policy
concerns nonrefundable retainers raise, the most important of which is that
such retainers interfere with a client's inviolate right to discharge her attor-
ney at any time without incurring a penalty.
Part III of this Article analyzes Cooperman, which gives effect to this
central public policy concern by condemning nonrefundable retainers as un-
ethical, and discusses the court's analysis and reasoning. In Part IV, we
discuss the arguments of those who criticize Cooperman and assess the hue
and cry Cooperman has spawned. That assessment forms the basis for our
suggestion, which we present in Part V, of an ethical rule that prohibits all
nonrefundable retainers. Part V concludes by offering broader perspectives
on Cooperman, showing that its core reinvigoration of the client discharge
right extends beyond nonrefundable retainers. This part also discusses how
Cooperman is likely to influence ethical rules governing other aspects of
the attorney-client relationship as well.
II. RETAINER LAW AND POLICY
A. General and Special Retainers
Most states have long recognized two kinds of retainer agreements be-
tween lawyer and client: special retainers and general retainers. 15 A spe-
the use of the nonrefundable retainer should be prohibited as being repugnant to public policy.")
(citation omitted) (copy on file with the authors and the North Carolina Law Review).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 84-116.
14. See infra notes 26 and 93.
15. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 157 n.44 (citing 1 STUART M. SPEvsER,
A7TroimYs' FEEs §§ 1:17 to :21, at 23-25 (1973); Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Strange Concept
of the Legal Retaining Fee, 8 J. LEGAL PROF. 123 (1983); CALnrOI~NiA RULEus oF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDucr Rules 3-700(D)(2), 4-100(B) (1989); Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 85-120
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cial retainer is an agreement between attorney and client in which the client
agrees to pay the attorney a specified fee in exchange for specified services
to be rendered. The fee may be calculated on an hourly, percentage or other
basis and may be payable either in advance or as billed.
A general retainer is an agreement between attorney and client in
which the client agrees to pay a fixed sum to the attorney in exchange for
the attorney's promise to be available to perform, at an agreed price, any
legal services (which may be of any kind or of a specified kind) that arise
during a specified period. 16 Because the general retainer fee is given in
exchange for availability, it is a charge separate from fees incurred for serv-
ices actually rendered.' 7 In other words, such fees are "earned when paid"
because the payment is made for availability.'
8
An attorney and client may also create a hybrid general-special retainer
by agreeing that part or all of the general retainer fee be applied to the bill
for any services actually performed."
B. Client Discharge Right
Without regard to the nature of a lawyer-client retainer, it is
well-established that a lawyer is a fiduciary for his client.2" Fiduciary du-
ties are imposed because society mandates that certain persons in whom
public trust and confidence are reposed should be vested with a fiduciary
obligation.2' That obligation is a matter of status, not contract.22 Lawyers
(1985); In re McDonald Bros. Constr. Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 997-98 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1990); i re
James Contracting Group, Inc., 120 B.R. 868, 871 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990)).
16. A "general retainer" is also sometimes called a "true retainer" or a "classic retainer."
E.g., CAL mORNiA RuLEs OF PROFEssiONAL CoNDucr Rules 3-700(D)(2), 4-100(B) (1989) (pro-
viding that an attorney must promptly refund any part of an advance fee that has not been earned
except if the fee is identified as a "true retainer," defined as a fee "paid solely for the purpose of
ensuring the availability of the [lawyer] for a matter or for a given period of time"); Baranowski
v. State Bar, 593 P.2d 613, 618 n.4 (Cal. 1979) (defining a "classic" retainer as "a sum of money
paid by a client to secure an attorney's availability over a given period of time").
17. Some have observed that these definitions are confusing, suggesting instead calling spe-
cial retainers "advance fee payments" and general retainers simply "retainers." CHARLEs W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs 505-06 (1986); see also Brickman & Klein, supra note 2, at
1066 n.143 (noting that the term "retainer" is ambiguous because it is used to refer to three
distinct circumstances: the employment contract itself, an advance fee payment (a special re-
tainer), and a fee paid for availability (a general retainer)).
18. See infra note 26.
19. Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 158 n.47. Examples of each of these kinds of
retainer agreements are given and analyzed infra text following note 98.
20. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 153 n.19.
21. Fiduciary duties include: maintaining confidentiality; maintaining undivided loyalty;
avoiding conflicts of interest; operating competently; presenting information and advice honestly
and freely; acting fairly; and safeguarding client property.
22. WoLFRAM, supra note 17, at 146; see also Lester Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitra-
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are fiduciaries because the act of retaining such a professional necessarily
invokes the need to repose trust and confidence in that person. Failure to do
so would impair the professional's ability to exercise independent profes-
sional judgment on the client's behalf. Hence the reposing of trust and
confidence in the lawyer is an essential element of the lawyer-client rela-
tionship-one that requires protection if the relationship is to achieve its
purpose effectively.23 To maintain the efficacy of the relationship, courts
have long provided that a client who loses that trust must therefore be free
to discharge her lawyer at any time, for any reason, without penalty.24 In
the next section, we discuss how nonrefundable retainers undermine this
client discharge right. We also examine other public policy objections to
nonrefundable retainers.
lion: A Dissenting View, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 277, 283 n.38 (discussing the origin and develop-
ment of fiduciary duties).
23. We develop this trust-based theory of the lawyer-client relationship more fully in Brick-
man & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 153-70.
24. In re Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855, 858 (App. Div. 1993) (citing Martin v. Camp, 114
N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916)). Martin v. Camp has "become the national rule, conquering the jurisdictions
with its force of reasoning." Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee When the Client Discharges a
Contingent Fee Attorney, 41 EMORY L.J. 367, 373 (1992) [hereinafter Brickman, Setting the Fee]
(citing, e.g., Owens v. Bolt, 118 So. 590 (Ala. 1928); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. St. Joseph's
Hosp., 489 P.2d 837 (Ariz. 1971) (en banc); Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 741 S.W.2d
233 (Ark. 1987); Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972) (en banc); People v. Radinsky, 512
P.2d 627 (Colo. 1973) (en bane); Cole v. Myers, 21 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1941); Rosenberg v. Levin,
409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982); Brookhaven Supply Co. v. Rary, 205 S.E.2d 885 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974); Booker v. Midpac Lumber Co., 649 P.2d 376 (Haw. 1982); Rhoades v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., 399 N.E.2d 969 (ill. 1979); Finney v. Estate of Carter, 164 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 1960);
In re Phelps, 459 P.2d 172 (Kan. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970); Wright v. Fontana, 290
So. 2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Palmer v. Brown, 40 A.2d 514 (Md. 1945); Salem Realty Co. v.
Matera, 410 N.E.2d 716 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 426 N.E.2d 1160 (Mvlass. 1981); Ambrose v.
Detroit Edison Co., 237 N.W.2d 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Lawler v. Dunn, 176 N.W. 989
(Minn. 1920); Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. 1982) (en bane); Baker
v. Zikas, 125 N.W.2d 715 (Neb. 1964); In re Estate of Poli, 338 A.2d 888 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975); Winston v. Fitch (In re Winston's Will), 59 P.2d 904 (N.M. 1936); Martin v. Camp,
114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916); Covington v. Rhodes, 247 S.E.2d 305 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 251 S.E.2d 468 (N.C. 1979); Fox & Assoc. Co. L.P.A. v. Purdon, 541 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio
1989); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bassett, 83 P.2d 837 (Okla. 1938); Sundheim v. Beaver
County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 14 A.2d 349 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940); Lake v. Winfield Fuller Co., 173
A. 119 (R.I. 1934); Bonham v. Farmer, 148 S.E. 878 (S.C. 1929); Ritz v. Carpenter, 178 N.W.
877 (S.D. 1920); Price v. Western Loan & Say. Co., 100 P. 677 (Utah 1909); Heinzman v. Fine,
Fine, Legum & Fine, 234 S.E.2d 282 (Va. 1977); Wright v. Johanson, 233 P. 16 (Wash. Ct. App.
1925), aft'd, 236 P. 807 (Wash. 1925); Clayton v. Martin, 151 S.E. 855 (W.Va. 1930); Enos v.
Keating, 271 P. 6 (Wyo. 1928)). See also Johnston v. California Real Estate Inv. Trust, 912 F.2d
788, 789 (5th Cir. 1990) (urging Texas to reject its "inequitable rule" and adopt instead the cli-
ent-discharge rule). But see Anderson v. Galley, 606 P.2d 90 (Idaho 1980); Tri City Equip. Co. v.
Modem Real Estate Inv. Ltd., 460 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1990); Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441
S.W. 2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969); Knoll v. Klatt, 168 N.W.2d 555 (Wis. 1969), overruled by Herro,
McAndrews & Porter, S.C. v. Gerhardt, 214 N.W.2d 401 (Wis. 1974).
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C. Nonrefundable Retainers
A nonrefundable retainer is one that "allow[s] an attorney to keep an
advance payment irrespective of whether the services contemplated are ren-
dered."'  It is important to distinguish between the nonrefundable retainer
and the general retainer. The nonrefundable retainer, a subspecies of the
special retainer, arises only in conjunction with the rendering of specified
services for a specified fee. A general retainer is not paid for the rendition
of legal services, but rather for assured availability to perform legal serv-
ices. Thus the nonrefundable retainer and the general retainer are separate
and distinct arrangements.26
A nonrefundable retainer penalizes a client for discharging his lawyer
because such action imposes a cost on the client. Under the trust-based
theory of the attorney-client relationship presented above, however, a client
must always have the right to discharge a lawyer without penalty. Because
that right would be directly impaired by a nonrefundable retainer in this
"special retainer" context, such agreements are therefore prohibited. 7
25. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
26. Although it is technically correct to refer to the general retainer payment as nonrefund-
able, this is a misleading characterization. Indeed, this characterization has led to confusion on
the part of some of Cooperman's critics, accentuated in part by Cooperman's failure to declare
explicitly that its holding was not applicable to general retainers. See infra text accompanying
notes 94-98.
Because a general retainer is paid for availability, it is therefore an option contract, which
may usefully be compared with a typical real estate option transaction. See Brickman & Cunning-
ham, supra note 4, at 158. An owner of real property sells an option to purchase the property for a
specified fixed price exercisable during a defined time period. The buyer of the option may or
may not decide to proceed with the purchase; either way, he is not entitled to return of the option
payment. Although it is correct to conclude that the option payment was nonrefundable, it would
be imprecise to do so because that characterization does not capture the essence of the transaction,
which is that the option buyer enjoyed a right in exchange for his payment. For the same reasons,
applying the term "nonrefundable!' to a general retainer is accurate but imprecise. The impreci-
sion creates confusion because it suggests issues that do not bear on why the payment is not
recoverable in the event the client decides not to exercise his option (i.e., direct the attorney to
render services during the period of availability).
27. See Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428 N.E.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. 1981):
The public policy of New York which permits a client to terminate the attorney-client
relationship freely at any time, notwithstanding the existence of a particularized retainer
agreement between the parties, would be easily undermined if an attorney could hold a
client liable for fraud on the theory that the client misrepresented his or her true intent
when the retainer was executed. When an attorney-client relationship deteriorates to the
point where the client loses faith in the attorney, the client should have the unbridled
prerogative of termination. Any result which inhibits the exercise of this essential right
is patently unsupportable. -
Notwithstanding abundant authority establishing both the fiduciary nature of the attor-
ney-client relationship and its corollary, the client discharge rule, an occasional court completely
fails to recognize any of this. See, e.g., Sado v. Ellis, 815 F. Supp. 761, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(purporting to apply New York law, the court inexplicably ignored these principles and enforced a
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Looked at another way, such a retainer is forbidden because otherwise, the
lawyer would be able to charge the client for work he did not do-the fee
would be "unearned."
On the other hand, if a client has paid a lawyer a fee that the lawyer
has fully earned, no fee forfeiture results if the client discharges the lawyer.
The client's discharge right remains unimpaired. This reasoning is the
predicate basis for the so-called "general retainer exception" to the client
discharge right, first elaborated in Martin v. Camp.2" This "general retainer
exception" to the client discharge right is, of course, not literally an "excep-
tion"-there are no "exceptions" to the client discharge right. Rather, it is a
circumstance.in which that inviolate right is unimpaired.29
The conclusion that a general retainer is earned when paid has histori-
cally been based on the attorney's availability to the client. The justifica-
tion for that conclusion rested on the theory that lawyers make two present
sacrifices at the time of signing a general retainer agreement: they reallo-
cate their time so that they can stand ready to serve the general retainer
client to the exclusion of other clients and they give up their right to be
hired by persons with interests that conflict with the general retainer client,
thus again foregoing potential income.30 It is in this sense that the fee is
deemed "earned when paid."
Using these two present sacrifices to defend the general retainer excep-
tion to the client discharge right is overinclusive and may also be underin-
clusive. It is overinclusive because these two justifications do not apply to
all general retainer situations. For example, a general retainer may be cre-
ated that does not require a lawyer to reallocate time or to decline other
representation.31 It may be underinclusive because there may be circum-
nonrefundable retainer agreement without any discussion). The Sado court's enforcement of a
nonrefundable retainer arose in a context in which the attorney had fully performed the services
contemplated by the retainer agreement, earning the advance fee, as well as additional fees. Id.
Accordingly, since no forfeiture was effected and the client discharge right was not impaired, the
court reached the right result in permitting the lawyer to keep the advance fee payment. That
result, however, had nothing to do with whether the agreement provided for a nonrefundable
retainer, rendering the court's statements not only inaccurate but also suparfluous. In other words,
the court could have reached the right result without misstating New York law.
28. 114 N.E. 46, 48 (N.Y. 1916).
29. E.g., Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Formal Op. 1991-3 (1991), re-
printed in N.Y. LJ., May 21, 1991, at 6 ("As a matter of law, the client's right to discharge a
lawyer is essentially absolute, and well-established legal precedent dictates that a client should not
be compelled to continue being represented by a lawyer in whom the client has lost confidence or
trust.").
30. Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 158.
31. Indeed, it is often unlikely that a general retainer will involve either of these
circumstances.
First, attorneys rarely turn down work opportunities because their plates are already full.
Rather they simply pile on more work and juggle their various undertakings, or in the
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stances in which the client discharge right is unimpaired, even if the lawyer
neither reallocated her time nor faced conflicts of interest. That, at least, is
what critics of Cooperman argue.32 Before analyzing Cooperman and its
critics, however, we discuss a few additional objections to nonrefundable
retainers, apart from the primary objection that they impair the client dis-
charge right.
Consider a rule permitting nonrefundable retainers, subject to the pro-
vision that persons harmed by unfair or unreasonable nonrefundable retain-
ers could obtain redress for that harm. This rule obviously would penalize
clients for discharging lawyers and enable lawyers to charge fees for work
not done. Furthermore, such a rule would necessarily be weighted in favor
of lawyers and against clients for several additional reasons. First, the at-
torney-client fee relationship is not an arm's-length one involving parties
bargaining in parity;33 rather, it is a relationship between a fiduciary and a
beneficiary in which, as discussed above, the client reposes trust and confi-
case of large firms, add more associates as needed. When they do accept a general
retainer, they do not set aside time and idly await the moment when their general re-
tainer client demands legal services.... Second, not all general retainer clients will
yield conflicts that preclude a lawyer from representing other potential clients.
Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 158-59 (citations omitted). To address the problem of
overinclusiveness, we have suggested an alternative approach that would not depend on whether
the retainer is characterized as a general retainer or a special retainer. Rather, the overinclusive-
ness may be cured by reference to another "exception" to the client discharge light: the attorney's
change of position. See Martin, 114 N.E. at 48. A literal reading of this change of position
exception would consume the Marlin v. Camp rule-almost any client relationship can be charac-
terized as producing a change in a lawyer's position. Accordingly, we have interpreted the change
of position circumstance to exist when either (1) there has been a change in the attorney's employ-
ment status or (2) the attorney has incurred some expense not arising in the ordinary course of a
particular representation. Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 157. Thus, if the attorney
reallocates his time in a way that constitutes a change of employment status (implicitly or explic-
itly requested by the client) or declines to represent other potential clients under circumstances
benefiting the client, then any fee paid in advance was earned when paid. As such, the client's
discharge right is unimpaired.
32. This is a generous statement; in fact, the critics of Cooperman make arguments attacking
the decision without ever addressing the client discharge right or even acknowledging (other than
in private) that it is the primary policy basis of the prohibition against nonrefundable retainers.
See infra text accompanying notes 88-133.
33. E.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 489-90 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) ("[I]t would be unrealistic to demand that clients bargain for their services in the same
arm's-length manner that may be appropriate when buying an automobile or choosing a dry
cleaner."); Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978) ("The detrimental
aspects of face-to-face selling... of ordinary consumer products have been recognized... and it
hardly need be said that the potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a lawyer, a
professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits [a] ... lay person."); GEORGE P.
COSTnGAN, CAsES AND Oranm AuoPrrns oN LEnAL ETcs 496 (1917) ("[A] lawyer's supe-
rior knowledge and experience give him an advantage which tempts him to overreach the client.").
Former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger has observed that "in multi-
ple disaster cases [such as] an airline crash... the transaction between an experienced lawyer and
inexperienced lay survivors in negotiating a contract for professional services is not an
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dence in the lawyer. Accordingly, the lawyer has a built-in advantage over
the client simply because of his professional status. 34 Second, as a practical
matter, he also understands and can evaluate legal claims better than his
client. Indeed, lawyers advertise this superior knowledge in initial consul-
tations with clients as a way to mystify law and legal process. This percep-
tion promotes the lawyer's advantage over the client.35 For all these
reasons, clients give great weight and tremendous deference to their law-
yer's opinions, judgment and advice on virtually all subjects they discuss,
including the consequences to the lawyer and the client of a particular fee
arrangement.
From this perspective, permitting nonrefundable retainers as a general
matter would erect a strong structural presumption of their validity in a
particular case, which clients would rarely be willing to challenge.36 The
lawyer would have additional structural advantages over the client because
he would possess the funds at issue. To recover those funds, the client
would have to incur out-of-pocket expenses with little or no assurance of
recovery. Such expenses would, of course, include other legal fees and
would also require a disgruntled client to repose trust and confidence in yet
arms-length transaction." Chief Justice Urges Look at Limit on Lawyers' Fees, AssocIATED Pnnss
NEws RELEAsE, May 13, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File.
34. See Chris G. McDonough, Legal Fees: Value Billing and the Reasonableness Require-
ment, N.Y. L.J., May 11, 1993, at 1, 7 (discussing and citing Stem v. Stem, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 2,
1993, at 33 (Sup. Ct. 1993)). McDonough discussed the superior knowledge of attorneys that
enables them to "consider the intangibles of the case, evaluate the competing claims of the parties,
and consider all of the factors in light of the existing law." Id. Specifically, the Stem court stated
that this knowledge
requires positive and definitive advice by counsel as to the probable outcome of the
proceedings and the cost of attaining satisfactory results. The client on the other hand is
very often affected by the emotional impact caused by the very nature of these proceed-
ings which diminishes judgment, and all too often unleashes wrath.
Id. (quoting Stem v. Stem, N.Y. Li., Apr. 2, 1993, at 33 (Sup. Ct. 1993)).
35. See Crry OF NEw YoRKc DEPARTmENTr OF CONsUMER AFFAIRs, WOMEN iN DIVORcE:
LAwYERs, ETmIcs, FEs AND FAnmzss 32 (1992) [hereinafter FES AN FAnuqFass] (citing Austin
Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Popular Legal Culture: Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law
Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1685 (1989):
[Tihe lawyer's power is enhanced when the lawyer positions him/herself as superior to
the client through "law talk." These are discussions of the legal system that characteris-
tically take place between client and divorce lawyer in which the lawyer portrays him or
herself as an insider with access to the right connections.);
see also MATnmsoNrt, Comrrman, supra note 12, at 1 (stating that clients in matrimonial cases
experience "intense and conflicting feelings of anger, rejection, guilt and vulnerability").
36. Even proponents of nonrefundable retainers and opponents of Cooperman recognize the
validity of these arguments. E.g., New York State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 599, at 6-7 (1989)
(observing that using the term "nonrefundable" to describe a fee that is refundable confuses cli-
ents, leading them to believe that the fee cannot be refunded). See NYSACDL Brief, supra note
10, at 6 n.1; Gillers, supra note 3, at 2.
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another lawyer.37
These structural advantages favoring lawyers over clients raise a re-
lated concern: lawyer overreaching, a significant problem in many con-
texts, particularly fee arrangements.38 The dangers in the context of
nonrefundable retainers appear to be especially acute, because there is a
strong positive correlation between the use of nonrefundable retainers and
the degree of client vulnerability in particular classes of cases. Thus,
nonrefundable retainers are most widely used in matrimonial, criminal de-
fense, and bankruptcy cases. 39 Clients in these classes of cases are espe-
cially vulnerable because of their impaired ability and limited resources
(whether financial, emotional or temporal) to interview a number of com-
peting lawyers or to investigate alternative fee arrangements. 40
Building on all the foregoing concerns, permitting nonrefundable re-
tainers would increase the risk that lawyers could evade scrutiny of fees that
are, by any objective measure, clearly excessive and thus in violation of
Disciplinary Rule 2-106 ("DR 2-106") of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (the "Code").4 1 A rule permitting a nonrefundable retainer
unless it is found to be clearly excessive or unreasonable would require that
such retainers be evaluated in the light of standards of excessiveness or
reasonableness such as those set forth in DR 2-106.42 Even if a nonrefund-
able retainer were not earned through the rendering of any services, this
37. For these reasons, we urge courts that strike down nonrefundable retainer agreements to
order restitution to the victimized clients in the same proceeding. See infra text accompanying
notes 78-83.
38. E.g., FEES AND FAIRNESs, supra note 35, at 24-25 (discussing the practices of attorneys
engaged in matrimonial representation and other domestic law matters in New York and revealing
instances of unethical conduct by lawyers, many related to charging excessive fees, including
nonrefundable retainer fees).
39. Brickman & Klein, supra note 2, at 1076 (bankruptcy); FEES AND FAIRNEss, supra note
35, at 3-4 (matrimonial); NYSADCL Brief, supra note 10, at 3 (criminal defense and matrimo-
nial). Such fees are also sometimes used in the corporate takeover defense context. Brickman &
Cunningham, supra note 4, at 158 n.50.
40. See FEES Am FAnNSS, supra note 35, at 7:
To make matters worse, divorce clients are usually in an emotionally vulnerable state.
Insecurity, anger, and pain-feelings common in marital break-up-put clients at a dis-
tinct disadvantage when dealing with an experienced lawyer.
Lawyers also have the advantage of possessing detailed financial information about
the client, and eventually about the spouse, as well.
41. DR 2-106 prohibits an attorney from charging a "clearly excessive" fee, evaluated by
reference to a variety of factors, including the time and labor required; the likelihood of preclud-
ing other employment by the lawyer; time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances;
nature and length of the professional relationship; and the experience, reputation and ability of the
lawyer. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsMILrrY DR 2-106 (1980). The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct prohibit charging "unreasonable" legal fees, as defined by reference to sub-
stantially similar criteria. MODEL Rut..as OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.5 (1992).
42. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RvsPoNsmxry DR 2-106 (1991).
NONREFUNDABLE RETAINERS
approach would require that it be evaluated for excessiveness. Although
that is a ludicrous proposition, a rule permitting nonrefundable retainers
would give it legitimacy. Thus, at least as a conceptual matter, one would
have to be ready to decide, for example, how much is too much for doing
no work: $10,000, $5,000, $2,50,0 or $100? Part of the motivation for the
rule against nonrefundable retainers is to forfend such ludicrous
considerations.
To summarize, nonrefundable retainers are objectionable for several
reasons apart from impairing the client discharge right: a contrary rule
would be lopsided in favor of lawyers and against clients; such fees cur-
rently are used most widely in contexts where client vulnerability is highest,
which suggests lawyer overreaching; and a contrary rule would have the
ludicrous effect of requiring evaluation of whether an unearned fee was
clearly excessive. Although these policy concerns are of course important
and perhaps indirectly reflected by the Cooperman decision, the driving
force behind that decision is the overriding public policy supporting the
prohibition against nonrefundable retainers-to protect the client's inviolate
right to discharge her lawyer at any time, for any reason, without penalty.
Im. ZN RE COOPERMAN
Cooperman was a disciplinary proceeding commenced by the New
York Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District (the "Grievance
Committee") against a member of the Bar of the State of New York (the
"respondent").43 The Grievance Committee charged the respondent with
fifteen counts of professional misconduct, consisting of five theories ap-
plied to three separate but substantially similar retainer agreements, each
43. In re Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855, 856 (App. Div. 1993). Each judicial department of
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, including the Second Department, has ap-
pointed grievance committees that are charged with the "duty and power to investigate and prose-
cute matters arising in or concerning attorneys practicing" in the various judicial districts of each
department. E.g., N.Y. CT. RuLEs § 691.4 (McKinney 1993). In the Second Department, such
committees are authorized to investigate professional misconduct by attorneys, id. § 691.5; to
issue reprimands (disciplinary action after a hearing), admonishments (disciplinary action without
a hearing), and letters of caution ("when it is believed that the attorney acted in a manner which,
while not constituting clear professional misconduct, involved behavior requiring comment"), id.
§ 691.6; and to recommend to the Second Department that probable cause exists for the filing of
disciplinary charges against attorneys who have been so investigated, id. § 691.4(h). Upon such a
recommendation, the Second Department may authorize the committee to prosecute the discipli-
nary proceeding, typically before a special referee (often a retired justice or associate justice of the
appellate division), whose conclusions are then reported to the Second Department for confirma-
tion or rejection. See Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856. The appellate division itself is authorized
to censure, suspend, and disbar attorneys over whom it has jurisdiction. N.Y. Jun. L. § 90(2)
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993). See infra note 59 for further discussion of the appellate divi-
sion's power to regulate the practice of law and to discipline attorneys practicing in New York
State.
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providing that a specified fee payment would be "nonrefundable." The ref-
eree who first heard the proceeding agreed with the Grievance Committee
on all charges." The court then confirmed the referee's report with respect
to twelve of the fifteen charges and suspended the respondent from the
practice of law for two years.'
A. Facts and Allegations
Edward Cooperman was a solo practitioner specializing in criminal
law, but he also engaged in general practice, including estate planning and
administration.4 6 In September 1985, the Grievance Committee issued him
a letter of caution advising him not to accept nonrefundable retainers be-
cause they were unethical.47 Nevertheless, in the summer of 1986, the re-
spondent entered into a fee agreement with a client in a criminal case,4 8
charging $10,000 in advance and describing it as nonrefundable even if the
client discharged the respondent.49  After the respondent noted his appear-
ance and unsuccessfully petitioned the court for leave to withdraw his cli-
ent's previously entered guilty plea, the client discharged the respondent
and unsuccessfully sought a refund."0 In June 1987, the Grievance Com-
mittee again found that the respondent had acted unethically and issued him
another letter of caution "for failure to return funds to his client based on a
non-refundable retainer agreement."51 Nevertheless, respondent subse-
quently entered into two additional similar nonrefundable retainer agree-
44. Cooperman, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
45. Id. at 859. With respect to the three charges not upheld, see infra text accompanying
notes 56-57.
46. See Harper, supra note 3, at 63.
47. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
48. The court excerpted the following from the text of that agreement: "My minimum fee
for appearing for you in this matter is fifteen thousand ($15,000) dollars. This fee is not refund-
able for any reason whatsoever once I file my notice of appearance on your behalf." Id. at 856.
Appendix A, infra, sets forth the entire text of all three agreements at issue in Cooperman, re-
dacted to conceal the identity of the parties. Appendix A also contains two letters from
Cooperman's clients, also redacted, that give an intimate illustration of the deep concerns and
public policy problems raised by nonrefundable retainers and elaborated in Part II. See supra text
accompanying notes 36-40. In one letter, for example, the client informs Cooperman that she had
reposed trust in him, that she had given him all the money she had (in advance of services), that he
breached that trust, and that the client therefore believed she was owed a refund of the advance fee
payments. See infra app. A, § 2.
49. According to the Grievance Committee's brief, at the time the respondent was retained,
the client had already pled guilty and was scheduled for sentencing. The parties contemplated that
the respondent would seek to have the guilty plea withdrawn and proceed to trial. Petitioner's
Post-Hearing Memorandum, Sept. 11, 1991, at 13; see infra app. A, § 2. The respondent noted his
appearance at the sentencing hearing, seeking precisely that result, but the judge summarily re-
fused the request. Petitioner's Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra at 15-16.
50. See Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
51. Id. at 859.
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ments, both of which were also at issue in the Cooperman disciplinary
proceeding.2
The Grievance Committee argued that all three of respondent's
nonrefundable retainer agreements were unethical, each for the same five
reasons. First, the agreements violated the lawyer's "obligation to refund
promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned."53
Second, the agreements created "an impermissible chilling effect upon the
client's inherent right, upon public policy grounds, to discharge an attorney
at any time with or without cause."'54 Third and fourth, with respect to each
agreement, "the respondent charged a clearly excessive fee and then wrong-
fully refused to refund any portion of the fee.""5 While the court accepted
each of these four arguments, it rejected without any discussion the Griev-
ance Committee's fifth argument, 6 that denominating the fee payment as
nonrefundable constituted "misrepresentation" in violation of DR
1-102(A)(4).
57
B. Analysis and Reasoning
Before discussing the Grievance Committee's arguments, the
Cooperman court distinguished a nonrefundable fee from a "minimum fee."
The respondent had denominated the advance fees paid to him as "mini-
mum fees," most likely in an effort to evade characterization of the agree-
ments as nonrefundable retainers.58 That strategy anticipated an opinion of
52. Id.; see infra app. A, §§ 3, 5.
53. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY
DR 2-110(a)(3) (1980)). The equivalent Model Rule is MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSiONAL CON-
Ducr Rule 1.16(e) (1992).
54. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
55. Id.
56. Petitioner's Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 49, at 19-24. For an interesting twist
on the misrepresentation theory, see In re Pearlman, 627 A.2d 314 (R.I. 1993). Pearlman involved
a lawyer who led his client to believe that an advance fee payment was solely to be applied against
services rendered but thereafter claimed the advance was nonrefundable. Id. The court affirmed
disciplinary sanctions against the lawyer on the grounds of misrepresentation. Id. at 316.
57. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
58. The court excerpted the following from the third (the most recent) of the three
agreements:
The MINIMUM FEE for [the lawyer's] representation.., to any extent is Ten Thou-
sand ($10,000) dollars. This fee will be paid Five Thousand ($5,000) dollars today and
Five Thousand ($5,000) on or before December 1, 1988. The above amount is the mini-
mum fee and will remain the minimum fee no matter how few court appearances are
made by [the lawyer].
Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857. In the first two of his retainer agreements, supra note 48 and
infra app. A, respondent used both terms, "minimum fee" and "nonrefundable fee," whereas in the
foregoing agreement he deleted references to "nonrefundable." The omission of "nonrefundable"
in the third agreement suggests that the respondent was aware of the controversy brewing at the
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the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics (the
"New York Committee") recognizing that although nonrefundable retainers
are probably unethical, much the same substantive result could be achieved
by simply denominating the advance as a "minimum fee." 9
time concerning the ethical invalidity of retainers denominated as nonrefundable. See infra note
59.
59. New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 599 (1989). In Opinion
599, the New York Committee attempted to create a new class of fees, which it called minimum
fees, and thereby ipse dixit circumvent the prohibition against something called nonrefundable
retainers. To invent this new animal, it used the following linguistic legerdemain:
[WMe address in this opinion the ethical propriety of an agreement covering a specific
legal matter that calls for an advance payment of a minimum fee that is not refundable
to a client if the representation ends before the attorney expends the requisite number of
hours that would, at the time charges specified in the retainer agreement, earn the mini-
mum fee.
Id. at 3. Of course, this passage describes a nonrefundable retainer. It is possible that the New
York Committee's views on this subject were influenced by the New York State Court of Ap-
peals, which earlier refused to enforce a nonrefundable retainer because "it did not state clearly
that [it] was intended to be a minimum fee and that the entire sum would be forfeited." Jacobson
v. Sassower, 489 N.E.2d 1283 (N.Y. 1985). See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 166-70
(reviewing Jacobson from the trial court to the court of appeals). The inference in Jacobson that a
minimum fee could be enforceable may have simply been an off-hand, unreflective remark, or it
could have been a conscious choice. It may have been the former since the court elected not to
discuss the validity of nonrefundable retainers. Even if it were the latter, however, that would not
validate the use of minimum fees by New York attorneys due to the following anomalies in the
jurisdictional structure of the New York lawyer discipline system.
New York is perhaps the only state in which the authority to regulate the practice of law is
thought to reside in the legislature. See Thomas H. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to
Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFFALo L. Rnv. 525, 534 (1983);
WoLFRAM, supra note 17, at 25. The New York legislature, however, has delegated to the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division the authority to define lawyer misconduct. N.Y. Jun. L.
§ 90(2) (McKinney 1993). It is under this grant of authority that the four judicial departments of
the appellate division jointly promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility for New York
State (the "New York Code"). See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, §§ 603.2, 691.2, 806.2,
1022.1 (1993). Accordingly, determinations about the ethical validity of the use of minimum fees
and nonrefundable retainers have been consigned by the New York legislature to the appellate
division. Of course, the New York Court of Appeals can overrule an appellate division decision
that a lawyer acted unethically by finding a constitutional infinmity or by finding that the appellate
division had misinterpreted a New York Code provision that the appellate division itself had
promulgated; that is, it could treat the appellate division as if it were an administrative agency
enforcing a rule that it had enacted under a legislative grant of authority. Moreover, the New
York Court of Appeals can at least substantially influence the appellate division in its rulemaking.
Consider the operative facts in Cooperman. It was the court of appeals in Martin v. Camp, see
supra note 24 and accompanying text, that promulgated the client discharge rule that the Second
Department of the appellate division applied in Cooperman to declare nonrefundable retainers
unethical. Although it is theoretically possible that the court of appeals would invalidate a con-
tract provision as against public policy even though the appellate division had held that it was not
unethical in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the contrary is simply unthinkable. See In re
Flannery, 212 N.Y. 610, 611 (1914) ("In establishing the standard of conduct to which the bar
must at its peril conform, the appellate division has wide discretion, with which we have neither
the wish nor the power to interfere."). Finally, the chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals
and members of that court may have constitutional authority to influence ethical standards, in-
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The Cooperman court then defined a nonrefundable retainer as one
that allows "an attorney to keep an advance payment irrespective of
whether the services contemplated were rendered."60 In contrast, the
Cooperman court defined a minimum fee as simply "a forecast by the attor-
ney of the minimum amount that a client can expect to pay in order for the
attorney to represent the client to completion in the contemplated matter."'"
By so defining nonrefundable fees and minimum fees, the court firmly re-
jected the New York Committee's sleight of hand effort to define "'mini-
mum fee' agreements as a subspecies of 'non-refundable fee'
agreements."62
Turning to the Grievance Committee's principal arguments, the
Cooperman court framed the issue in broad terms, asking "whether
nonrefundable retainer agreements are against public policy and therefore
void," and then answering in the affirmative.63 It arrived at this answer by
investigating whether a fee paid in advance of services to be rendered and
denominated as nonrefundable was "earned" when paid. Said the court:
"Since an attorney's fee is never truly non-refundable until it is earned, the
use of this term ... is misleading ..... I4 In other words, the court's simple
and straightforward analysis is based on an unassailable premise: A lawyer
cannot charge a fee for doing nothing.65
dependent of the rulemaking authority of the appellate division. The New York State Constitution
empowers the chief judge to
establish standards and administrative policies for general application throughout the
state, which shall be submitted by the chief judge to the court of appeals, together with
the recommendations, if any, of the administrative board. Such standards and adminis-
trative policies shall be promulgated after approval by the court of appeals.
N.Y. CONsT. arL VI, § 28(c).
60. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
61. Id. Moreover, "[i]f the attorney is discharged prior to completion but after entering into
a 'minimum fee' agreement he or she is entitled to payment in quantum meruit." Id.
62. Id. (citation omitted). In a prior opinion dealing with the related issue of whether ad-
vance fee payments are to be deposited to the client trust account or the lawyer's office account,
discussed infra text accompanying notes 147-51, the New York Committee engaged in similar
sophistry and similarly sought to preserve for lawyers the opportunity to take advantage of their
clients in a fee matter. This latter opinion, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics
Op. 570 (1986), is sharply criticized in Lester Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma:
Should Payments Be Deposited to the Client Trust Account or to the General Office Account?, 10
CARDOZO L. REv. 647, 654-75 (1989) [hereinafter Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Di-
lemma], and Brickman & Klein, supra note 2, at 1094.
63. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
64. Id.
65. See Arens v. Committee on Professional Conduct, 820 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Ark. 1991)
("Just as a lawyer cannot bill a client for work he has never performed in the past, a lawyer cannot
bill a client for work he will never perform in the future.").
More simply yet, a lawyer must make his money the old fashioned way-he must earn it.
See Woo, supra note 3, at B10 (quoting the senior author of this Article as saying, "Look, every-
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The Cooperman court proceeded, perhaps unnecessarily, to buttress its
conclusion by applying the Disciplinary Rules of the Code that it had
adopted.66 The court found that "[ihe words 'non-refundable fee' are im-
bued with an absoluteness which conflicts with DR 2-11O(A)(3), which pro-
vides that a lawyer who withdraws from employment shall refund promptly
any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned."'67 The court
thus made an important clarification by holding that DR 2-110(A)(3) sub-
stantively prohibits charging a nonrefundable retainer. 6 This interpretation
of DR 2-1 10(A)(3) is consistent with the Cooperman court's other holdings
as well: In deciding whether a fee agreement is enforceable, the issue is
whether the fee has been earned.
The Cooperman court also adopted the Grievance Committee's second
argument. First, the court affirmed two longstanding principles of New
York law: that a client may terminate a lawyer at any time, with or without
cause,69 and that any attempt by a lawyer to hinder that right (as by charg-
ing a nonrefundable retainer fee) violates the Code.7 0 Following those prin-
ciples, the court held that the respondent's retainer agreements represented
an attempt to hinder the client discharge right and therefore violated the
Code.71 The court's reaffirmation of the principle that a lawyer may not
impair a client's right to discharge him without penalty also rests on the
fundamental inquiry of the entire proceeding-whether a fee had been
earned such that the fee arrangement did not impair the client discharge
right.
The Cooperman court also accepted the Grievance Committee's third
and fourth arguments, that the fees respondent charged were clearly exces-
sive and that it was unethical for the respondent not to refund such fees
upon each client's request.72 Indeed, some commentators have criticized
body in society would love to get paid in advance and get to keep the money, even if they don't do
any work. Lawyers would be the only ones who would get to do that, if the [Cooperman) court
had decided it was ethical").
66. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 691.2 (1993); see supra note 59.
67. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
68. Until this pronouncement, it was by no means clear that DR 2-110(A)(3) substantively
stated that charging a nonrefundable retainer violates that rule. Brickman & Cunningham, supra
note 4, at 167 n.109.
69. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 858 (citing Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916)); see
supra text accompanying notes 20-24. For a detailed analysis of Martin, see Brickman & Cun-
ningham, supra note 4, at 157-70.
70. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 858. The Cooperman court did not specify what provision
of the Code the respondent violated. The court probably was referring, however, to DR
2-110(B)(4), which provides that "a lawyer.., shall withdraw from employment, if... [h]e is
discharged by his client."




the Cooperman court for not limiting its opinion to precisely these two
holdings, arguing that the court could have rendered a holding limited to the
narrow facts of the case by finding solely that the respondent's fees under
the contested agreements were excessive and therefore violated DR
2-106. 73 Of course the Cooperman court had to decide whether to limit its
holding to the narrow facts before it or to use Cooperman as a platform
from which to launch a broader rule applicable in circumstances beyond
such facts.74 Such criticism, however, overlooks two important points sug-
gesting that the court's choice in announcing a broad rule was correct.
75
First, the criticism ignores the distinction between the prohibition against
nonrefundable retainers, which seeks primarily to protect the client dis-
charge right, and DR 2-106, which provides guidance for determining
whether a legal fee is clearly excessive and says nothing about the client
discharge right.76 Second, because the appellate division is the legally
sanctioned regulatory body governing the practice of law in New York
State,7 7 the Cooperman court arguably was duty-bound, once it determined
that nonrefundable retainers were unethical, to declare them definitively
impermissible.
We offer a separate criticism of Cooperman with respect to the other
aspect of the court's holding-declaring it unethical for respondent to re-
fuse to refund such fees to his clients upon their request. This criticism
goes straight to the fundamental principle underlying the decision and this
73. E.g., Gillers, supra note 3, at 3 (criticizing the Cooperman court for deciding the broader
issue of validity of nonrefundable retainers generally when the respondent in the proceeding "was
intent on defending his own agreements," with no one before the court advocating the broader
issue); Harper, supra note 3, at 64, 66 n.12 (stating that the Cooperman court could have limited
its decision to facts because it found respondent's fees to be excessive, but "leap[t] at the chance"
to "decide, as a matter of law, whether every nonrefundable fee agreement violated the discipli-
nary rules").
74. Under the grant of authority to define lawyer misconduct, supra note 59, the court there-
fore had the following options in dealing with the issue of nonrefundable retainers: (1) it could
have added to the Code a specific provision declaring them impermissible (a suggestion we make
in Part V, infra); (2) it could have made that declaration by in effect holding that it had already
done so-which is arguably what it did in Cooperman-and then deciding Cooperman itself on
its narrow facts or more broadly; or (3) it could have limited its pronouncement in Cooperman to
prospective effect only.
75. The criticism is driven partly by appeal to the beauty of the adversary system that, critics
believe, was not at work in Cooperman because the respondent and the Grievance Committee
argued only about the specific agreements at issue. See supra note 71. This criticism, however,
wrongly depicts the nature of the adversary system, which operates at the level of the specific.
Therefore, the respondent and the Grievance Committee's focus on the respondent's agreements
was appropriate, and the court's assessment of the broader issue could have been-and apparently
was-informed by reference to published materials concerning it, including materials the parties
brought to the court's attention.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 112-13.
77. See supra note 59.
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Article: the protection of clients. Notwithstanding the court's determina-
tion that the respondent acted unethically in refusing to refund the unearned
advance fee charges, the Cooperman court declined to order restitution of
those fees, even though it condemned them as unethical. 78 In other words,
the respondent was not ordered to turn over to his clients any of the money
he improperly withheld by imposing an unethical fee arrangement.
The Cooperman court's refusal to order restitution might be defended
on the grounds that the court was sitting as a disciplinary court reviewing an
ethics proceeding, rather than as a civil court evaluating the merits of a
client's claim against his attorney.79 We would reject this defense, how-
ever, because the court was competent to order restitution in the context of
an ethics proceeding and had compelling reasons to do so in Cooperman.
The appellate division is expressly empowered by statute to order restitu-
tion in any disciplinary proceeding in which it suspends an attorney from
the practice of law upon a finding that the attorney "wilfully misappropri-
ated" money or property belonging to his client.8 0 In addition, even before
the legislature allocated such power to the appellate division by statute, the
appellate division had independently exercised the power in disciplinary
proceedings to order lawyers to make restitution of funds obtained in viola-
tion of ethical principles."'
The Cooperman court should have ordered restitution for two policy
reasons. First, declining to order restitution wastes judicial and administra-
tive resources because each of the three victimized clients must now com-
mence and prosecute separate civil lawsuits to recover funds that each client
78. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
79. See id. (stating that rationale for refusing to order restitution was court's conclusion that
the question of restitution "is more properly decided in a civil proceeding at the trial level"). For a
contrary holding, see In re Pearlman, 627 A.2d 314 (R.I. 1993) (ordering attorney to repay ad-
vance fee payment and characterizing his refusal to refund it upon termination as "exacerbating"
his "inexcusable" conduct in attempting to extract a nonrefundable retainer through deception).
80. N.Y. JuD. L. § 90-6a (McKinney 1993); see In re Cataldi, 571 N.Y.S.2d 319 (App. Div.
1991); In re McCarthy, 573 N.Y.S.2d 619 (App. Div. 1991); In re Cooper, 563 N.Y.S.2d 690
(App. Div. 1990). We believe charging a nonrefundable retainer involves the willful misappropri-
ation of client money when the client discharges the attorney prior to the performance of legal
services that fully consume the fee, because the part of the advance fee not earned by effort
remains the client's property. Accordingly, when the attorney charges a nonrefundable retainer
and therefore retains the unearned portion of the fee, he has misappropriated client funds.
81. In re Francess, 333 N.Y.S.2d 294 (App. Div. 1972). Indeed, the usual practice in attorney
disciplinary proceedings in a majority of states is to condition the lifting of any suspension upon
paying full restitution. E.g., In re Cornelius, 521 P.2d 497,499 (Alaska 1974); McKnight v. State
Bar, 810 P.2d 998, 1007 (Cal. 1991); Brookman v. State Bar, 760 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Cal. 1988);
Colorado v. Creasey, 811 P.2d 40, 43 (Colo. 1991); Florida Bar v. Nagel, 440 So. 2d 1287 (Fla.
1983); In re Holz, 533 N.E.2d 818, 824 (111. 1988); Louisiana State Bar v. Ranel, 534 So. 2d 951,
955 (La. 1988); West Virginia State Bar v. Gallaher, 376 S.E.2d 346, 350 (W. Va. 1988). But see
In re Ackerman, 330 N.E.2d 322, 324 (Ind. 1975) (expressly rejecting this approach).
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should have been able to recover upon a simple request. As entirely new
and separate proceedings, those lawsuits will entail costs to all parties-as
well as to the judicial system-far greater than the marginal cost necessary
for the Cooperman court (or its referee) to have determined the proper
amount of restitution.82 Second, by not ordering restitution (or taking any
other action to protect the respondent's victimized clients), the Cooperman
court's very pronouncements favoring client protection ring somewhat
hollow, an emptiness shared by criticisms of Cooperman, to which we now
turn.
8 3
IV. THE HuE AND CRY
In addition to criticizing the scope of the Cooperman decision, 4
members of the criminal bar and others have attacked some of the basic
principles underlying the decision.85 These attacks reflect the fact that
nonrefundable retainer agreements are used extensively in the ordinary
course of their business. 86 Accordingly, these attorneys regard Cooperman
as a substantial threat to their established livelihoods and practices. Critics
82. This result is particularly unwelcome at a time when the Second Department is straining
under a caseload that has produced tremendous backlog. That backlog has led the New York
legislature and the New York Court of Appeals to evaluate extraordinary steps to alleviate the
burdens, including subdividing the existing Second Department to create a new Fifth Department
in New York's Appellate Division. See Gary Spencer, Fifth Department Plan Appears Dead for
Now; Legislature Deadlocked on Method for Aid, N.Y. LJ., June 14, 1993, at 1.
83. That the court made no provision for protecting the clients who directly suffered from the
respondent's misconduct underscores recent indictments of the grievance process. See, e.g., FMns
AND FAmanss, supra note 35, at 46-49 ("[Ihe major disadvantage of the current grievance pro-
cess is that the aggrieved party can obtain no individual redress. No money is returned."). That
failure is particularly troublesome in the context of Cooperman because it is by no means clear
that the respondent's victimized clients are even aware of their rights in this regard. Certainly the
Cooperman opinion does not indicate whether the court, its clerk, or the grievance committee has
endeavored to notify them, although that would seem to be in order. Indeed, the opinion gives no
indication of whether the respondent has funds equal to the unearned portion of the advance fees
or, if he does, whether any such amounts have been deposited with the court or remain in the
lawyer's trust account or are otherwise protected for the benefit of such clients.
84. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
85. See e.g., NYSACDL Brief, supra note 10; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Brief, supra note 10;
Gillers, supra note 3. For example, the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NYSACDL) and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) filed a joint
brief supporting the respondent's motion for reargument. See NYSACDL Brief, supra note 10.
The NYSACDL has a membership of almost 800 lawyers and the NACDL has a membership of
approximately 9,000 member lawyers and 30,000 affiliated lawyers. Id. at 1.
86. NYSACDL Brief, supra note 10, at 2 (stating that nonrefundable retainers like the one at
issue in Cooperman am "commonly used"); id. at 3 (noting that such retainers "are by no means
unusual; attorneys have been entering into them for many years, particularly in criminal and matri-
monial cases and some corporate practices"); id. at 7 (stating that "many attorneys" use such
retainers); see also Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 150 nn.2-3 (citing nonrefundable
retainer agreements as widely used in lawyers' handbooks and study aids).
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of Cooperman collectively cite three examples as encapsulating their oppo-
sition to it and certain of its underlying ethical principles.
8 7
A. Misconstruction of Retainer Law and Policy
The first example was offered by Professor Stephen Gillers, a leading
ethics scholar, in one of the first public assessments and criticisms of
Cooperman."8 Consider Professor Gillers's argument and examples, which
follow from a single premise:
Time is not and never has been the only commodity that lawyers
offer to sell and that clients seek to buy. Lawyers also sell the
assurance of their availability. The market has long recognized
value here. We should have good reasons before we proscribe
that recognition.
[Assume the] government has announced a $100 million
civil antitrust case against five companies in the same industry.
One of them, a Fortune 100 company, is the first to approach the
state's most skilled antitrust defense lawyer. It agrees (through its
in-house counsel) to pay him $10,000 against usual hourly rates.
The fee is said to be 'earned when paid'-i.e., by virtue of the
retainer-and so 'non-refundable'.
Or assume a federal stock fraud indictment of six major Wall
Street figures. In exchange for a $5,000 fee that is 'earned when
paid', a top criminal defense lawyer notes her appearance.
In each of these examples, a lawyer and a client have agreed
that a lawyer's commitment to be available (and the lawyer's cor-
responding unavailability to others) has value in and of itself.
That agreement deserves respect.8 9
Professor Gillers's argument has initial appeal, but so did the songs of the
Sirens." Close analysis of the argument, with particular focus on the use of
87. Critics of Cooperman make another argument in addition to the examples discussed in
the text. They contend that the decision is unfair to Cooperman because the lav and ethics gov-
erning nonrefundable retainers were allegedly unclear prior to Cooperman. See, e.g., NYSACDL
Brief, supra note 10, at 3-8. The Cooperman court disposed of this issue by deciding that it was
not unfair because Cooperman had twice been given written notice that his fee agreements were
unethical. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 859. In addition, at least as of the time of respondent's
third agreement at issue in Cooperman in or around November 1, 1988, there was no reasonable
basis to believe that the retainer agreements drafted by Cooperman were permissible. See Brick-
man & Cunningham, supra note 4, Cf. In re Gustafson, 493 N.W.2d 551, 553 (Minn. 1992)
("reject[ing] respondent's argument that the status of the law regarding advance fee payments
was unclear before 1991" in light of both published ethical guidelines and a law journal article on
the subject).
88. See Gillers, supra note 3, at 2.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. See HOMER, TBE ODYSSEY 170 (T.E. Shaw trans., Woodsworth Editions Ltd. 1992):
Your next land-fall will be upon the Sirens: and these craze the wits of every mortal
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the term "availability," reveals its destructive potential. Moreover, even a
cursory analysis of the argument shows a misconstruction of retainer law
and policy that effectively rejects the distinction between special retainers
and general retainers.
1. Meaning of "Availability"
Availability is the essence of a general retainer.91 A general retainer is
an agreement by a lawyer, for value, to forego her right to refuse to perform
services for the client even if the need for specific services arises at a time
of great inconvenience to the lawyer. It is a commitment to be available to
represent the client in matters where the services may or may not need to be
rendered in matters that may yet be unknown and undefined. The client
paying a general retainer is therefore getting something for the payment: a
contractual commitment that the lawyer will be on call to handle the client's
legal matters, if and when the client needs her.9" The arrangement is, in
essence, an option contract, under which the client has the right at any time
during the "exercise period" to call upon the lawyer and direct her to render
services.93
In his examples of lawyers being hired to perform specific services,
Professor Gillers has coined a new term, "assurance of availability," which
who gets so far. If a man come on them unwittingly and lend ear to their Siren-voices,
he will never again behold wife and little ones rising to greet him with bright faces when
he comes home from sea. The thrilling song of the Sirens will steal his life away, as
they sit singing in their plashet between high banks of mouldering skeletons which flut-
ter with the rags of skin rotting upon the bones. Wherefore sail right past them: and to
achieve this successfully you must work bees-wax till it is plastic and therewith stop the
ears of your companions so that they do not hear a sound. For your own part, perhaps
you wish to hear their singing? Then have yourself lashed hand and foot into your ship
against the housing of the mast, with other bights of rope secured to the mast itself.
Ensure also that if you order or implore your men to cast you loose, their sole response
shall be to bind you tighter with cord upon cord. That way you may safely enjoy the
Sirens' music.
91. RESTATEMENT OF THm LAW, Tam LAW GovERNIwG LAWYERS § 46, cmt. e, at 213 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1991) ("A retainer, as that term is used in this Section... is a fee paid to ensure that a
lawyer will be available for the client if required."). Notably, the Restatement goes on to provide
that such a fee may not be greater than is "reasonable in the circumstances," based on whether the
amount of the fee "bears a reasonable relationship to the income the lawyer sacrifices by accepting
it." Id. This is noteworthy because of the position it adopts on what we believe to be a difficult
and often unperceived question-whether general retainer fees constitute "legal fees." Cf. Green-
berg v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 129 N.E. 211, 212-13 (N.Y. 1920) (characterizing a general
retainer agreement as an "ordinary" business agreement); see Brickman & Cunningham, supra
note 4, at 163 (discussing Greenberg and its distinction between fees for legal services and gen-
eral retainer fees). We do not address that question in this Article.
92. See WoLFRAM, supra note 17, at 506 ('The purpose of the [general retainer] is to assure
the client that the lawyer will be contractually on call to handle the client's legal matters.").
93. See supra note 26.
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he regards as a compensable service. As used by Professor Gillers, how-
ever, the term "assurance of availability" is unrelated to the "availability"
that is the essence of the general retainer. Rather, he employs the term
solely in special retainer situations. As such, "assurance of availability" is
nothing more than the commitment of every lawyer to be available to per-
form the legal service that she has agreed to provide. A lawyer hired by a
client to write a will, litigate a claim, handle a divorce, or represent an
accused defendant necessarily agrees to be available to perform the service
that she has undertaken to perform. Because every lawyer assures availabil-
ity every time she agrees to perform a service, allowing the lawyer to
charge separately for that assurance of availability effectively enables the
lawyer to charge a nonrefundable retainer.
Perhaps Professor Gillers's interpretation follows from the Cooperman
court's failure to state explicitly the distinction between general and special
retainers. It should be clear that the court followed that distinction in sub-
stance, however. After all, the pivotal issue in the court's analysis was
whether the fees at issue were "earned when paid."94 That is, of course, the
essence of the general/special retainer distinction.95 Indeed, the primary
prongs of the court's analysis hinged on whether the fees were earned: (a)
the court specified that "[s]ince an attorney's fee is never truly
non-refundable until it is earned," the use of the term "non-refundable" is
misleading, and (b) the court found that DR 2-110(A)(3) prohibits
nonrefundable retainers precisely because they are not earned when paid.
96
Recall that the reason general retainers do not impair the client discharge
right is precisely that general retainers involve a fee that is earned when
paid.97 Because Cooperman does not proscribe fees that are earned when
paid (including general retainers), the first analytical issue in evaluating any
retainer agreement-and determining whether Cooperman applies to it-is
whether it is a general retainer or a special retainer. Consider a few exam-
ples of how this analysis would proceed.98
First, consider an executive whose three-year employment contract
with a major corporation has expired. The executive is planning to begin
work in a competing enterprise. However, his old contract includes a re-
strictive covenant not to compete for a period of one year from expiration,
and he is concerned about being sued for breaching that covenant. The
94. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
95. See supra accompanying notes 28-30.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
98. In the examples that follow, the term "available" is used in the broad sense of the general
retainer, meaning a commitment (wholly apart from any specified representation) to stand ready to
render legal services at any time during a specified period if and when the client demands them.
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executive retains a lawyer who agrees to be available to represent the exec-
utive at any time during that year, at the attorney's regular hourly rate, in
the event the executive's former employer challenges the executive's right
to work in the competing enterprise. A fee of $2000 for the year is agreed
to and paid. As a matter of definition, this is a general retainer because a
specified fee ($2000) is paid in consideration for the lawyer's commitment
to be available during the period. Analytically, the fee can be seen as
"earned when paid" because the payment was given in consideration for
availability. A discharged attorney in this circumstance would be entitled
to retain that fee (both before and after Cooperman).
Second, consider a small business owner who decides to sell his com-
pany and negotiates a sale price with a third party. The owner then retains a
lawyer to negotiate a contract for the sale of the business. A fee of $200 per
hour is agreed to and an advance payment of $3000 is paid. As a matter of
definition, this is a special retainer because a specified fee ($200 per hour)
is agreed to be paid in exchange for specified services to be rendered (nego-
tiating and drafting the contract). Analytically, the advance fee will be
earned over time as services are rendered. If the "progress" (time actually
expended times the hourly fee) exceeds the advance, then additional pay-
ments will be called for. A discharged attorney in this circumstance would
not be entitled to retain any portion of the $3000 advance that was not
offset by progress (both before and, emphatically, after Cooperman).
Third and finally, consider a hybrid case, in which the general/special
retainer distinction becomes less clear-cut. A spouse seeking a divorce
which is expected to be resisted and to require protracted judicial proceed-
ings approaches a lawyer who says his fee will be $200 per hour. In addi-
tion, the lawyer says that $10,000 must be paid in advance and that any
progress will be charged against that advance. The retainer agreement pro-
vides that the $10,000 advance fee will be used to pay for hours as charged
but that it is also for the attorney's availability and is nonrefundable. As
noted, here the general retainer/special retainer classification scheme be-
comes complicated as a matter of definition-is this a general retainer, a
special retainer, or something else? More practically, would a discharged
attorney in this circumstance be entitled to retain all or any portion of the
$10,000? Cooperman is not explicit on this subject.
As Professor Gillers's argument interpreting the term "availability" so
broadly suggests, lawyers drafting an agreement at the outset of such a rep-
resentation would undoubtedly attempt to characterize and denominate the
arrangement as a general retainer and would probably stress that the ad-
vance fee payment was given precisely for availability. We believe, how-
ever, that no matter how the arrangement is characterized or denominated
by the lawyer in the fee agreement, in substantially all cases where a hybrid
1993]
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retainer is used, the advance fee will be intended as prepayment for actual
services to be rendered rather than for availability. In other words, we ex-
pect the ordinary client in ordinary circumstances to believe that payment is
being made against actual services rather than for availability.99 Moreover,
once an attorney has agreed to provide specific services, she has agreed to
be "available" to perform those services. This is not the "availability" that
is the essence of the general retainer. Nonetheless, some attorneys will fol-
low Professor Gillers's argument and characterize such a fee payment as
being paid in exchange for availability precisely in an effort to legitimate
retaining it upon discharge."
Indeed, attorneys can be expected to devise many strategies and fee
structures to enable validation of nonrefundable fee agreements in the
post-Cooperman world. For example, attorneys could design a variant of
the hybrid retainer by specifying that $7000 of the $10,000 advance fee
payment constitutes a general retainer given in exchange for availability
and not subject to offset, and $3000 of the advance fee payment is to be a
special retainer, given in advance for and charged off against specific serv-
ices actually rendered. We believe that the characterization of the $7000 as
payment for availability is likely to be purely pretextual. Strategies like this,
therefore, demand the closest scrutiny for the same reasons that apply to the
hybrid case: Lawyers can be expected to characterize their fee arrange-
ments in whatever way is necessary to enable them to keep the advance fee
if they are discharged, irrespective of client beliefs that their fee payments
are for actual services to be rendered.
If, therefore, a hybrid were legitimated in a circumstance where the
advance payment was not clearly and unambiguously a general retainer,
then the fee form books would quickly respond by declaring that to be the
favored form of retainer agreement.' 0 ' Thereafter, all attorneys seeking to
99. See In re Pearlman, 627 A.2d 314 (R.I. 1993). In that case, the attorney claimed that his
written fee agreement constituted a nonrefundable retainer, but the disciplinary board found there
to be "no question" that "any reasonable person" would conclude "that the receipt of a sum cer-
tain, in this case $4,500, was a retainer against which would be applied the cost of legal services
actually performed by the firm as per the standard hourly rates." Id. at 315. It is also clear that
Cooperman's clients believed that payment was being made against actual services. See, e.g.,
infra app. A, § 4 (letter from Cooperman's client requesting return of the advance fee "less the
value of any services [Cooperman] rendered and any expenses [Cooperman] incurred to date").
100. This is a common subterfuge. E.g., In re NBI, Inc., 129 B.R. 212 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991)
(discussed in Brickman & Klein, supra note 2, at 1074-75 and holding that although law firm
described its fee arrangement as a general retainer, it was a special retainer); Hegeman-Harris Co.
v. Town of Greenburgh, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 25, 1993, at 25 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that although
attorney described his fee arrangement as a minimum fee, it was a nonrefundable retainer); In re
Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 857 (App. Div. 1993) (same); Jacobson v. Sassower, 452 N.Y.S.2d
981, 984 (Civ. Ct. 1982) (same as in In re NBI), affd on other grounds, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App.
Term 1983), aff'd mer. 483 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App. Div.), affid mem. 489 N.E.2d 1283 (N.Y. 1985).
101. Nonrefundable retainer agreements are reproduced in lawyers' handbooks and practice
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charge a nonrefundable retainer would use that form or a variant and the
prohibition against nonrefundable retainers will have been successfully sur-
mounted. The hybrid, therefore, is not simply a Trojan Horse that will un-
dermine by stealth the guardians of the client discharge rule. Rather, it is a
cup of hemlock." 2
Accordingly, we believe the proper approach to the hybrid case (and
all variations on the hybrid case) is to recognize as a rule of construction a
strong presumption-rebuttable by the attorney by clear and convincing ev-
idence-that no part of the retainer was given for availability as that term is
used in the general retainer context. °3 This approach-presuming that any
retainer other than a "pure" general retainer is a special retainer-is sug-
aids. See RAOUL L. Fm.DER, LAWYER'S PRACTICAL HANDBOOK TO THE NEW DIVORCE LAW 27-29
(1980); JAMES W. McRAE, LEGAL FEns AND REPRESENTATION AGREEMEmNT 88 (1983) (Mono-
graph Series, ABA Section of Economics of Law Practice); NEW YoRK MAT oIMOmAL PR CTICE
197-98 (PLI 1979); 1 AM. JUR. FoRMs, Trials, 1:1874 (1993).
102. We invite the reader to adopt the null hypothesis: Legitimate a hybrid and attempt to
bound that "exception" in a manner that does not effectively eliminate the prohibition against
nonrefundable retainers and substitute for it the issue of whether the forfeited advance payment
constitutes an excessive or unreasonable fee. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
103. Presumptions are generally designed to assist courts and other tribunals in managing
circumstances in which direct proof of a matter is difficult. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
245 (1987) (citing 1 DAvID W. LouisELL & CHmSTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
541-42 (1977)). Presumptions are also sometimes designed to allocate burdens of proof in the
light of "considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy."
Id. (citing EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE 968-69 (3d ed. 1984); FED. R.
EviD. 301). All these reasons apply in the context of determining whether a retainer agreement is
a special retainer or a general retainer. First, the only direct proof is likely to be the agreement
itself, as well as testimony of the attorney and the client. As elaborated in Part II of this Article, in
the contexts in which nonrefundable retainers are typically used, the nature of the attorney-client
relationship suggests that the designation of the fee structure in the agreement as a general retainer
can almost never be respected as reflecting the intention of the client. The testimony of the re-
spective parties is likely to be no more probative. Accordingly, the probability is almost absolute
that a retainer fee is not a general retainer given in exchange for availability but rather is a special
retainer intended as an advance fee to cover specific legal services to be rendered. Thus, as a
matter of fairness and public policy, it is appropriate to erect the presumption that any given
retainer agreement is a special retainer rather than a general retainer (in whole or in part). To
overcome the presumption, a lawyer must demonstrate through objective evidence beyond the
agreement and direct testimony of either the attorney or the client that the fee was intended for
availability. There is likely to be only a small class of possible proof of this nature. Such proof,
however, would be found in the circumstances in which both the attorney and the client operated
before and immediately following the commencement of the representation. Without attempting
to be exhaustive, those circumstances would include, with respect to the lawyer, hiring new asso-
ciates as a result of entering into the agreement and, with respect to the client, her degree of legal
sophistication and experience with lawyers and whether she was or might be involved in any
pending or potential litigation, proceeding, or negotiation. Cf. Greenberg v. Jerome H. Remick &
Co., 129 N.E. 211, 213 (N.Y. 1920) (finding agreement to be an ordinary business agreement,
"specific and definite in its terms, and in effect negatives the presumption that as to the client it
should be deemed a contract at will").
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gested by the lower court opinion in Jacobson v. Sassower.1 4 Jacobson
involved a hybrid retainer agreement similar to the one in the divorce case
just described. 1°5 The court found that, despite the attorney's contrary char-
acterization of the retainer agreement, the agreement was not a general re-
tainer; therefore, that "exception" to the client's discharge right did not
apply.1 6 In other words, the attorney did not rebut the presumption that
such a hybrid arrangement is a special retainer rather than a general re-
tainer. Indeed, this approach is also consistent with and follows from
Cooperman, which ultimately required the attorney to demonstrate that the
fee he charged was earned-another way of saying the arrangement in-
volved a special retainer unless the attorney could show otherwise.
10 7
2. The Fiduciary Standard
We also must reject Professor Gillers's second argument that, because
the legal services marketplace has recognized that assurance of availability
has value, then any such agreement deserves respect. Under this approach,
any fee that a lawyer is able to extract from a client-regardless of how
104. 452 N.Y.S.2d 981, 984 (Civ. Ct. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App.
Term 1983), aff'd mer. 483 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App. Div.), aff'd mem. 489 N.E.2d 1283 (N.Y. 1985).
105. The retainer agreement specified compensation at an hourly fee of $100 to be paid as
billed, plus a "non-refundable retainer of $2,500," payable upon commencement of the relation-
ship that would be "credited against... charges." Id.
106. Jacobson, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 984 (observing that an hourly charge was to be offset against
the advance payment and that the lawyer was to represent the client "for a period of unspecified
duration in connection with a particular legal matter"). Accordingly, the trial court refused to
enforce the agreement on the ground that it impaired the client's right to terminate the attorney at
any time, without penalty. Id. (citing Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916)). The three
appellate courts reviewing this case (including the New York Court of Appeals) avoided this
issue. Each of those courts disposed of the case by holding the agreement unenforceable on the
grounds of ambiguity. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 166-70 (reviewing Jacob-
son from the trial court to the court of appeals).
107. Our proposed approach is analogous to that suggested by the current version of the Re-
statement. First, the Restatement provides that "[a] fee payment that does not cover services
already rendered is presumed to be a deposit against future services." RESTATEMENT oF THE LAW,
THE LAW GoVERNING LAwYERS § 50, cmt. g, at 247 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1991). Second, it effec-
tively puts the burden on the lawyer to overcome that presumption:
In any [fee dispute] proceeding the lawyer has the burden of persuading the trier of fact,
when relevant, of the existence and terms of any fee agreement, the making of any
disclosures to the client required to render an agreement enforceable, and the extent and
value of the lawyer's services.
Id. § 54(2), at 278. We must part company with the Restatement at this point, however, because it
also provides that "[a] client and lawyer may agree that a payment is a retainer rather than a
deposit." Id. § 46, cmt. g, at 247. The only limitation the Restatement would impose in this
context is that the lawyer "must inform the client that a payment will be a retainer." Id. at 248.
We think this position reposes too much confidence in lawyers' faithfulness in discharging their
fiduciary obligations to clients and gives too little weight to the rationale requiring the imposition
of such obligations. Permitting nonrefundable retainers to be enforced so long as the client agrees
is equivalent to declaring nonrefundable retainers permissible.
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pernicious, overreaching, or unfair-would be entitled to respect simply be-
cause the lawyer was able to collect it.' From that perspective, all
nonrefundable retainers have a market value demanding respect, because
the issue of the nonrefundable retainer only arises if a client has paid it. As
a fiduciary for his client, however, a lawyer-in fee arrangements and
otherwise-is held to a "fairness-in-fact" standard, which is a higher, more
exacting, and less self-interested standard than is applied to commercial
parties in free market transactions."0 9 That the market will bear a fee
charged by a lawyer never has been and never can be a justification for the
ethical validity of charging that fee."'
3. Misapplication of DR 2-106
Professor Gillers does recognize that market forces alone cannot be the
basis for evaluating the legitimacy of attorneys' fees and that ethical rules
must play a role. It is necessary, however, to justify any ethical restrictions
that are imposed on market forces."' The policy purpose justifying the rule
against nonrefundable retainers is to protect the client discharge right. With-
out that prohibition, clients would never have the right to discharge an attor-
ney without penalty. Put another way, Professor Gillers's approach to
nonrefundable retainers would be the same approach taken with respect to
other kinds of attorney fees: none would be barred a priori, but rather their
validity would be evaluated solely in terms of the standards for excessive-
ness set forth in DR 2-106.112 We believe this position involves a severe
108. Market forces unrestrained by ethical mandates would produce astronomical lawyer's
fees. See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 595, 617
n.89 (1993) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Korotki, 569 A.2d 1124 (Md. 1990), in which
the court disciplined a lawyer who charged a contingent fee equal to 75% of the recovery).
109. Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration, supra note 22, at 284 nn. 41-43. See GEOF-
FRY C. HAZARD, ETmcs nN rm P.Acncs OF LAW 99 (1978); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W.
WmLiAM HODES, Tim LAW OF LAwyERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLEs OF PROFS-
SIONAL CoNmucr 71 (1985) ("A fee.., must be objectively reasonable.... Unreasonable fees
[are prohibited even if] the client consents.").
110. The rule envisioned by opponents of Cooperman, as articulated by Professor Gillers,
would be less protective of clients dealing with their fiduciaries (lawyers) than existing rules
applicable to consumers dealing with merchants in arm's length commercial transactions. Con-
sider a merchant selling a used car to a consumer and charging the equivalent of a nonrefundable
retainer-a nonrefundable downpayment. Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718(1)-(2),
the seller can keep only a maximum of $500 of any downpayment (in addition to any incidental or
consequential damages) while under the "assurance of availability" rule, a lawyer would be per-
mitted to keep any advance fee amount he can bargain for (subject only to tests for excessiveness
or reasonableness under Model Code DR 2-106 or Model Rule 1.5).
111. See supra text accompanying note 89 (quoting Gillers, supra note 3, as saying, "We
should have good reasons before we proscribe [the market's] recognition [of value in what law-
yers offer]").
112. Gillers, supra note 3. Others have also made this suggestion; see, e.g, NYSACDL Brief,
supra note 10, at 8.
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misapplication of DR 2-106, however, because it collapses two discrete
bodies of law having different policy goals: DR 2-106 itself and the law
governing nonrefundable retainers.
DR 2-106 identifies factors that bear on the excessiveness of a legal
fee.11 3 But application of the law governing nonrefundable retainer agree-
ments must precede any consideration of DR 2-106, because any such fee
must be given in exchange for some service before the reasonableness of
that fee even comes into question. These bodies of law are necessarily dis-
tinct-and must be kept distinct-because the prohibition against
nonrefundable retainers is based on and protects the client discharge right.
That right and its protection have nothing whatever to do with the exces-
siveness of a legal fee, the only subject DR 2-106 addresses. Accordingly,
a retainer fee determined to be unearned cannot be nonrefundable because
that would impair the client discharge right. There is no need to evaluate
such an arrangement further, whether under DR 2-106 or otherwise." 4
To summarize, we are unpersuaded by Professor Gillers's suggestion
that lawyers' fees can be justified on the basis that the lawyer offered his
"assurance of availability" to perform a job he agreed to perform. We can-
not countenance a proposal that would permit lawyers to charge fees in the
same way that nonfiduciary, commercial actors do. Moreover, not only do
Professor Gillers's recommendations fail to take into account the primary
policy objection to nonrefundable retainers-that they impair the client dis-
charge right-they also ignore the other policy bases for the prohibition
summarized in Part II of this Article: the lopsidedness of a rule permitting
nonrefundable retainers; the acute risks of lawyer overreaching suggested
by the strong positive correlation between the use of nonrefundable retain-
ers and the level of client vulnerability; and the undermining of the prohibi-
tion against charging an excessive legal fee." 5 We cannot accept Professor
Gillers's suggestions because they are made without reference to or ac-
knowledgement of the public policy bases upon which the prohibition
against nonrefundable retainers rests, including, without limitation, the cli-
ent discharge right set forth in Martin v. Camp."
6
113. Substantially identical criteria are set forth in Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct concerning the "reasonableness" of a legal fee.
114. To put it simply, an unearned fee is by definition excessive. Brickman & Klein, supra
note 2, at 1087-88 (citing Simon v. Auler, 508 N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (11. App. Ct.), appeal denied,
515 N.E.2d 127 (l. 1987); Arens v. Committee on Professional Conduct, 820 S.W.2d 263, 264
(Ark. 1991)). But even this truism needs to be taken one step further: the problem with the
unearned fee is that it impairs the client's discharge right.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
116. 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916).
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B. The Criminal Defense Bar
The second example opponents of Cooperman cite in support of their
position arises in the context of criminal defense practice. 117 Consider the
following example. An indictment charges several defendants with con-
spiracy to violate anti-racketeering laws. The alleged co-conspirators im-
mediately contact the top criminal defense lawyers in the jurisdiction, all of
whom now charge nonrefundable retainers. One of the defendants retains a
lawyer and then discharges him. Because of the possibility of conflict of
interest, the lawyer is thereafter disabled from representing any of the other
alleged co-conspirators.
Without the ability to charge a nonrefundable retainer as compensation
for the possibility of discharge and the resulting opportunity loss, the law-
yer argues, he has suffered significant financial loss. He further contends
that his claim is distinguishable from that of most other lawyers because,
while their opportunity loss claims are inchoate, unrealistic, and merely
self-serving, his is empirically demonstrable. For example, he demonstrates
that whenever there is an indictment of alleged leaders of organized crime,
the same half dozen attorneys (including him) are invariably the first
choices of those indicted and the fees range from $50,000 to a significant
multiple thereof. Being "conflicted" out of the representation by being ter-
minated by a defendant visits a substantial financial loss by denying the
lawyer the opportunity to represent one of the other defendants. Charging a
nonrefundable retainer affords compensation for that possibility.
Although persuasive from the lawyer's perspective, these arguments
must be rejected for broader policy reasons that take account of client as
well as societal interests. First, a nonrefundable special retainer creates a
significant conflict of interest between a criminal defense lawyer and his
client. To be sure, all fee arrangements give rise to conflicts of interest.118
Hourly rate fees provide incentive to devote more time than is necessary or
beneficial; fixed fees provide incentive to shirk some tasks; and contingent
fees provide incentive to the lawyer to minimize time and risk in order to
maximize return, while the client would seek to maximize the lawyer's time
and risk in order to minimize risk and maximize return. 11 9
Nonrefundable special retainers give rise to still other conflicts of in-
117. We have discussed these issues with a number of criminal defense lawyers who supplied
the examples and articulated the arguments discussed in the text.
118. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 109, at 70-71 ("Setting.. . fees for professional services
inevitably creates a conflict between lawyer and client.... A potential conflict of interest...
[between the interests of lawyer and client] attends the commencement of every client-lawyer
relationship .... "). See Lester Brickmnan, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet With-
out the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 48 (1989) [hereinafter Brickman, Hamlet].
119. See Brickman, Hamlet, supra note 118, at 47-48.
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terest, however, which add a constitutional dimension because of the right
to effective assistance of counsel grounded in the Sixth Amendment and its
application to fee arrangements.120 Moreover, nonrefundable advance fees
in criminal defense cases can diminish the trust and confidence that a client
reposes in her lawyer. For example, the amount of the advance fee presum-
ably is determined by the lawyer on the expectation (or at least the degree
of probability) of going to trial. If, however, the lawyer advises the client to
accept a plea bargain instead of going to trial, the client may well conclude
that the lawyer's advice is motivated by (or at least tainted by) self interest:
the sooner the case is terminated by an accepted plea bargain, the less work
the lawyer will have to do and, therefore, the higher his effective hourly rate
earned from that representation. If the lawyer underestimated the amount of
time required in the representation in determining his nonrefundable ad-
vance fee retainer, then his incentive to devote sufficient time to trial prepa-
ration may be reduced. Finally, clients would be uncertain how to evaluate
advice to accept a plea bargain in such a fee-shortfall situation because the
client will not be sure whether the lawyer is motivated by financial or pro-
fessional concerns.
121
120. The right to effective assistance of counsel "encompasses a subsidiary right to representa-
tion by counsel free from conflict of interest" In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 536 F.2d 1009, 1012
(3d Cir. 1976); see United States v. Sims, 845 F.2d 1564, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 774 F.2d 624, 627 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th
Cir. 1978).
121. Similar problems infect the lump sum fee, a variant of the nonrefundable retainer charged
by many criminal defense lawyers. For example, a lawyer charges a defendant $10,000 to repre-
sent him in a driving-while-intoxicated prosecution. The fee agreement provides that the $10,000
is to be paid in advance and is the entire fee to be paid, irrespective of how involved or lengthy
any proceedings (including any trial) may be. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw, THE LAw Gov-
ERnmNG LAWYERS § 46, cmt. e, at 213 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1991) (distinguishing lump sum fees
from general retainers and advance payments). After expending ten hours of work over a few
days, the lawyer negotiates a plea bargain of reckless endangerment, which carries a penalty of
probation. The client accepts. Can the client retrieve a substantial part of the fee? We think so
because we do not believe the lump sum fee is any more worthy of respect than the minimum fee
artifice rejected in Cooperman. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. This is because a
lawyer in such a circumstance would certainly have contemplated the probability of the plea bar-
gain, whereas his client would have only limited knowledge about its likelihood, and therefore
imposing the lump sum fee structure suggests that the lawyer overreached the client.
In cases where the lawyer did not overreach but instead charged the lump sum fee in a matter
where the outcome was in considerable doubt, and where the lawyer was therefore undertaking the
risk that any proceedings could last longer than he had contemplated, the analytical framework
would be significantly altered. If in that case a fortuitous event yielded an early plea bargain,
would the client be entitled to a partial refund of the fee? In this circumstance, the analytical
structure more closely resembles the contingent fee situation than it does the nonrefundable re-
tainer situation. Although contingent fees are prohibited in criminal cases, DR 2-106(c); Model
Rule 1.5(d)(2), the basis for the prohibition has been called into question. Brickman, Hamlet,
supra note 118, at 47-52; Karlan, supra note 108, at 595; Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise of the
Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. Crum. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498 (1991). We take no position in this
Article on the appropriateness of the lump sum fee in this latter context
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In addition to the enhanced risk of conflicts of interest in using
nonrefundable special retainers in the criminal defense context, general re-
tainers in that context also present peculiar problems. This is because the
line between a special retainer and a general retainer in the criminal defense
context will tend to be drawn at the same place where the nature of the
representation begins to expose the lawyer to charges of either being an
accessory before the fact or a co-conspirator in the client's conduct. Con-
sider an attorney who is retained by a client under investigation for fraud or
similar "white collar" crime. The attorney is to undertake immediate action
to forfend the indictment and be available to represent the accused in the
event those actions fail. 2 ' Because such a retention involves a particular,
specified undertaking, it is a special retainer and therefore would not legiti-
mately expose the lawyer to charges of being an accessory before the fact or
a co-conspirator. 123 On the other hand, consider an attorney who is retained
to be available to represent an enterprise conducting illegal activities. This
attorney's fee arrangement may well qualify as a general retainer to the
extent his remuneration is given for his availability to render legal services
if an investigation or indictment arises. In such a case, however, charges
that the lawyer is a co-conspirator in the enterprise begin to look colora-
ble.124 Indeed, it is virtually impossible to conceive of an attorney-client
relationship in the criminal defense context that both qualifies as a general
retainer and avoids exposing the attorney to nonfrivolous charges of being a
co-conspirator.
Finally, apart from whether a retainer is classified as special or gen-
eral, the criminal defense bar's arguments ignore the primary public policy
concern that mandates the prohibition of nonrefundable fees: Compensat-
ing the lawyer in advance for giving up the right to represent other individu-
als subverts the original client's right to discharge his attorney. In some
cases, a client may be willing to retain and pay a lawyer to disable that
122. The criminal defense lawyers we consulted told us that avoiding indictment is a major
task for the elite criminal defense bar, especially those specializing in white collar crime, and can
involve a greater expenditure of time and effort than a trial.
123. As for the attorney's "availability," its meaning in this context is not the availability that
is the essence of the general retainer, but rather simply another incantation of the "assurance of
availability" theory already disposed of. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
124. See United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), in which the government
sought on conflict of interest grounds to disqualify Bruce Cutler and other lawyers from represent-
ing John Gotti and Gotti's co-defendants at trial, alleging, among other things:
The named attorneys are "house counsel" to the "enterprise" charged in the indictment,
namely, the Gambino Organized Crime Family, and that their representation of and
services to various members of that enterprise whose obligations for legal fees were paid
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lawyer from representing some adversary. Indeed, this situation is often the
predicate for a general retainer and is defensible because the client is paying
for and getting something he wants.1" Charging a client for the lawyer's
losses from client preclusion cannot be defended, however, if the client
does not gain anything as a result of that preclusion. Hence, in the forego-
ing example, the ultimate policy choice is whether (a) to protect the law-
yer's financial interest by permitting him to charge a nonrefundable retainer
to one client because that representation precludes him from representing
the other defendants or (b) to protect the client's inviolate right to discharge
the lawyer without being penalized for doing so. The policy mandate com-
pels protecting the client and not the lawyer, even though it is clear that the
lawyer is exposed. That exposure comes with the professional and ethical
territory in which lawyers practice.
Criminal defense lawyers advance the additional argument, however,
that the professional and ethical territory in which they operate is different
from that in other kinds of practice. They maintain that nonrefundable re-
tainers are necessary to protect against the unique hazards of criminal de-
fense practice and offer two examples to make their case. First, the costs of
the limitations on withdrawing from a proceeding are said to be particularly
high in criminal defense practice. Permission to withdraw from a criminal
case is almost always required by rules of criminal tribunals and is rarely
granted.12 Indeed, in criminal defense practice judges regularly forbid
lawyers to withdraw from representation even when a client fails to pay the
lawyer's fees, instead ordering such lawyers to continue representation with
remuneration (at court-determined rates) funded through public
resources. 127
Even if the assertions in this first example are true, however, there is a
125. See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 158 n.50 (discussing the retention by
numerous corporate clients of the Skadden, Arps law firm partly for the purpose of preventing that
firm from representing adversaries in battles for corporate control that raged in the 1980s). But cf.
Brickman & Klein, supra note 2, at 1047 n.46 (discussing colonial law that "prohibited a litigant
from hiring more than two attorneys because the litigant could otherwise 'fee' or hire all of the
available attorneys and deprive the opponent of counsel") (citation omitted).
126. DR 2-110 governs an attorney's withdrawal from employment, providing in part as fol-
lows: "If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a
lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a proceeding before that tribunal without its per-
mission." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmrrY DR 2-110 (1980).
The equivalent Model Rule is 1.16(c). See generally Hammond v. T.J. Litle & Co., 809 F.
Supp. 156, 159-63 (D. Mass. 1992) (interpreting standards governing attorney's request to with-
draw, in light of client's failure to cooperate with lawyer and disregard of client's fee obligations
to law firm).
127. See Karlan, supra note 108, at 620-21 n.103 (citing as examples People v. Woods, 457




parsimonious solution to the criminal defense lawyers' dilemma that does
not require debating the need or defensibility of nonrefundable retainers.128
The particular problem identified is that a criminal defense lawyer may
reach a point in a trial at which his client refuses (or is unable) to pay his
fees, yet a judge orders him to continue to do the work. This problem may
be addressed by requiring a client to pay his lawyer in advance of the trial,
perhaps requiring payment for the entire trial. Making that advance fee
nonrefundable, however, is an additional step beyond that required to pro-
tect the lawyer. In sum, demanding an advance fee is defensible; denomi-
nating it as nonrefundable is both inapposite to the problem and not
required by any unique circumstances of the criminal defense bar.
129
These criticisms bring criminal defense lawyers to their second exam-
ple, generated by what is commonly called the Tjoflat Rule,130 which many
jurisdictions in the United States follow.' 3' The Tjoflat Rule provides that,
except upon an order of the tribunal, retained counsel in a criminal trial has
an obligation to continue to represent a defendant until successor counsel
either enters an appearance or is appointed.' 32 As a practical matter, this
rule compels criminal defense trial lawyers to continue to represent a de-
fendant on appeal without regard to whether the client is able or willing to
pay for the appellate work. When so invoked, the rule rests on the theory
that if fee payments received at trial exceed court-determined rates, then it
is reasonable for the tribunal to require that those excess amounts be ap-
plied to defray the costs of services rendered on appeal. Because we are not
aware of any similar rule applicable in noncriminal contexts, we concede
that such a rule distinguishes criminal defense practice from other kinds of
law practice.
However, we fail to see how charging a nonrefundable retainer com-
128. Indeed, although some have acknowledged them in private, no members of the criminal
defense bar nor any other critics of Cooperman have publicly acknowledged, let alone debated,
the fundamental public policy reasons, including protecting the client discharge right, that require
the prohibition of nonrefundable retainers.
129. Moreover, the argument that these special factors render criminal defense practice sui
generis is also unpersuasive. The applicable ethical rules do not distinguish among lawyers based
on their area of practice, and judges reviewing withdrawal requests are concerned with the fair and
orderly administration of justice equally in criminal and non-criminal fora. See, e.g., Haines v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 425 (D.N.J. 1993) ("In cases when withdrawal would
significantly impair a client's ability to find substitute counsel or to maintain the action, courts
have refused to permit withdrawal despite the fact that representation has become unprofitable for
the client's lawyers.").
130. The rule is named for the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. Chief Judge Tjoflat promoted the Eleventh Circuit's formal adoption of the rule.
See Bob Andelman, 'Tjoflat' Fees Rule is Argued in Court, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 3, 1992, at 3.
131. See, e.g., lsr Cut. R. 46-1(D)(1).
132. Id.
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pensates an attorney for the risk that he bears in the face of the Tjoflat Rule.
If, under that rule, the lawyer is compelled to represent his client on appeal
without compensation, he receives no benefit from having charged that cli-
ent a nonrefundable advance fee. A lawyer receives a benefit from charg-
ing a nonrefundable retainer only if he is discharged before completing the
agreed upon task; in that circumstance, the lawyer is enriched by the forfei-
ture. Hence, the criminal defense bar argues in effect that charging a
nonrefundable retainer provides the lawyer additional compensation when
he is discharged to offset the loss he sustains when he is compelled to work
without a fee. This is the same argument that contingent fee lawyers make:
they are entitled to be overcompensated in some cases in order to make up
for the unsuccessful ones. The argument is without merit. Overcharging a
client in one case violates a lawyer's fiduciary and ethical duty to that client
not to charge an unreasonable or excessive fee.133
C. Ethics Experts
Opponents of Cooperman have also developed the example of attor-
neys who testify as expert witnesses on the law of lawyering or who assist
in matters by serving "of counsel."' 3 4 It is widely assumed that a half
dozen or so of such experts, mostly law school professors, are the most
sought after of their type and command substantial hourly fees plus substan-
133. Brickman, Hamlet, supra note 118, at 32 n.5. The overcompensation argument was ap-
proved in a now-antiquated book on contingent fees, FREDEICK B. MAcKNNON, CorTIar
Fans FOR LEGAL SEicEs 182 (1964) ("The idea of using overcharges to some clients to offset
undercharges to others does not seem an unfair way to support a system of providing competent
legal services to clients who need them."). We recognize the overcompensation argument as a
variation of robbing Peter to pay Paul. As George Bernard Shaw noted, taking from Peter to pay
Paul always meets with the approval of Paul. Thoughts on Business Life, FoRnEs, Apr. 23, 1984,
at 176. It is instructive to consider in the contingent fee context just who Peter and Paul are.
Peter, of course, is the client being overcharged for attorneys' fees unjustified by the risk borne by
the attorney. It may be thought that Paul is a subsequent client with a high risk claim who, but for
the lawyer's overcharging Peter, would not gain representation. If his claim prevails, he has
surely gained a windfall-but it is a one-time windfall, typically amounting to approximately
one-third of the settlement or award. The lawyer is also a beneficiary, claiming one-third to
one-half of the gross amount. But unlike the subsequent client, the lawyer is a repeat beneficiary.
His stake in the process far exceeds that of the subsequent client. Accordingly, it is more correct
to regard Paul as the attorney who overcharges Peter to pay himself to accept a future high-risk
case that he would be less likely to accept were he not flush with the funds that were mulcted from
Peter. An attorney owes each and every client an obligation not to charge that client any more
than a fair and reasonable fee. Moreover, the overcompensation argument itself is specious be-
cause contingent fee percentages are typically set without regard to risk (and to the extent risk is
considered, cases where risk exceeds the typical one-third to one-half contingency fee are simply
not taken). In other words, contingent fee lawyers typically rob each client without allocating the
booty to later clients.
134. We have discussed these issues with a number of opponents of Cooperman who sug-
gested the examples and articulated the arguments discussed in the text.
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tial nonrefundable retainers. These experts argue that they have toiled long
and hard in the vineyards to build a reputation that enables them to com-
mand such fees. Charging an hourly rate-even $1,000 an hour-in lieu of
a nonrefundable retainer may not be adequate compensation in a given mat-
ter for any of several reasons. For example, the matter could be concluded
after only an hour or two of the expert's effort (because his expertise ena-
bled him to see right to the heart of the matter) or because settlement was
induced or at least substantially assisted by either identifying the expert as
"of counsel" or as an expert witness. 135 These opponents of Cooperman
thus argue that denying them the opportunity to charge a nonrefundable
retainer prevents them from realizing the full economic value of their repu-
tations and their investments in those reputations.
We believe that, although these arguments have initial appeal, they too
sound of the Sirens' songs.' 36 Proponents of this position argue that enter-
ing an appearance is a compensable event that has value in the legal serv-
ices marketplace.' 37 We believe, however, that entering an appearance and
tasks of similar import are synonymous with "assurance of availability" as
that term has been used to defend nonrefundable retainers-these terms are
simply linguistic variations on the theme of representation. From this per-
spective, denominating an advance fee as solely for the appearance is sim-
ply a semantic subterfuge to evade the prohibition against charging a
nonrefundable retainer. The Cooperman court said it plainly: "We find
that it is unconscionable that the respondent could claim that he earned
$15,000 by filing a notice of appearance on a client's behalf, which is the
sum and substance of the fee agreement."' 38
Opponents of Cooperman would argue that a determination of uncon-
scionability should depend upon the identity and reputation of the attorney.
That is, although it was unconscionable for Mr. Cooperman to make such a
claim, it would not have been unconscionable for a leading ethics expert or
criminal defense lawyer to do so. Acceptance of that argument would inject
into every prosecution challenging a nonrefundable retainer a fact-finding
component that would require the disciplinary board to argue, and the pre-
siding panel to conclude, that the lawyer/respondent was not sufficiently
eminent to charge a fee of such magnitude for a mere appearance (or some
act of similar import). It would effectively eliminate the prohibition against
nonrefundable retainers and transform every such prosecution into a claim
135. See FED. R. Crv. lNoc. 26(B)(4)(A)(i) (providing for discovery of opposing party's ex-
pert witnesses expected to testify at trial).
136. See supra note 90.
137. See supra text accompanying note 89.
138. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855, 858 (App. Div. 1993).
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of violation of the DR 2-106 prohibition against charging an excessive fee
or the Rule 1.5 prohibition against charging a clearly unreasonable fee.
We think such a proposition is untenable for several reasons. First, it
once again ignores the fundamental policy objection to nonrefundable re-
tainers-that they interfere with the client's right to discharge her lawyer at
any time without penalty. This policy is simply not considered by DR
2-106 or Model Rule 1.5.139 Second, as a matter of administration of jus-
tice, this procedure would be unwieldy and would impose greater costs on
the disciplinary boards without producing any public gain, resulting in a
reluctance to prosecute the use of nonrefundable retainers. 140 Finally, it
would effectively transform the system of lawyer discipline into an invidi-
ously hierarchical and discriminatory process. Prominent lawyers would be
insulated, while middle-tier and inexperienced lawyers would be exposed.
There would be, in effect, one rule for the elite and another for the masses.
We believe that any exception to a general prohibition of nonrefund-
able retainers would consume the rule and render it nugatory. We invite the
opponents of Cooperman to prove us wrong. We believe the burden is on
them to propose a practical rule that, in an administratively feasible manner,
effectuates the purpose of the Cooperman court-to preserve the fiduci-
ary-law based client discharge right by banning nonrefundable retainers-
but which also permits some lawyers to charge the full economic value of
the use of their names-a practice that would result in payment of substan-
tial sums to attorneys neither for the purpose of procuring their availability
(as in the general retainer context) nor for the rendering of a specified
service.
V. IMPLICATIONS
A. The Need for a Rule
A clear statement of the governing ethical rules is required in light of
the substantial hue and cry Cooperman has produced" '4 and the arguments
that the respondent in Cooperman should not be disciplined severely be-
cause the ethical rules governing nonrefundable retainer agreements were
unclear when he used such agreements. 42 Accordingly, we advocate
.139. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
140. Indeed, if our analysis is correct, such a fact-finding component would produce public
loss, since permitting the use of nonrefundable retainers except when unreasonable or unfair cuts
against several public policy concerns and impairs the client discharge right. See supra notes
33-42.
141. We are not alone in recognizing the need for such a rule. See NYSACDL Brief, supra
note 10, at 9-10 (suggesting establishment of an advisory committee to explore the issues raised
by lawyer fee agreements generally and to formulate related standards and guidelines).
142. See supra note 87.
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promulgating a rule specifying that nonrefundable retainers are impermissi-
ble as a matter of ethics. 143 We propose the following text:144
Nonrefundable Retainers Prohibited; Advance Fees Depos-
ited to Client Trust Account. When a client (or any other person
on behalf of a client) pays a lawyer or law firm any sum of money
or delivers any other property as payment in advance for specified
services to be rendered in a specified matter, no such money or
property shall be or become the property of the lawyer or law
firm until such time, if any, as it shall have been earned through
the rendering of such services. All such money and property shall
be deposited by the lawyer or law firm promptly upon receipt into
a separate trust account mandated in this jurisdiction for the re-
ceipt of client property,* and shall be withdrawn only when such
portions of it shall have been earned through the rendering of
such services. The lawyer or law firm shall promptly refund any
unearned money or property to the client upon the conclusion of
the representation. Any effort, by contract or otherwise, to con-
travene this Rule shall be null, void, and unenforceable, and law-
143. Nonrefundable retainers have also been held to be impermissible as a matter of contract
law. Joel R. Brandes, P.C. v. Zingmond, 573 N.Y.S.2d 579, 584 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (following the
arguments contained in Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 176-88, and holding
nonrefundable retainer agreements invalid as a matter of contract law). Although an explicit statu-
tory rule making it clear that nonrefundable retainers are unlawful may be appropriate, it does not
seem as urgent as one specifying that nonrefundable retainers are unethical because (1) Brandes
did not produce the same level of excitement and concern as Coopernan, and (2) denominating
nonrefundable retainers as unethical very likely renders them void and unenforceable as a matter
of public policy. See Hegeman-Harris Co. v. Town of Greenburgh, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 25, 1993, at
25 (Sup. CL 1993) (citing and following Cooperman to "set aside as illegal and void" a
nonrefundable retainer).
144. We have been informed that many members of the Louisiana Bar and others understand a
recent Louisiana court rule, LOUiSIANA RULES OF PRoFESSIoNAL CoNi)ucr Rule 1.5(0, to mean
that nonrefundable retainers are now permissible in Louisiana. A careful reading of the rule
shows the opposite to be true. The lead paragraph provides that funds paid in advance of services
to be rendered "become the property of the lawyer," but "subject to the provisions" of a suc-
ceeding paragraph. LouiSiANA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.5(f) (1993). That suc-
ceeding paragraph specifies that upon any later fee dispute, the lawyer must (1) refund any
unearned portion of a fee previously paid and (2) if the lawyer and client dispute the amount of
such funds that were earned, the lawyer must deposit funds equal to the amount in dispute to a
client trust account until the dispute is resolved. Id. at (f)(6). Hence, nonrefundable retainer fees
are not only not permissible under this rule, they are in fact forbidden.
This erroneous interpretation of the Louisiana rule repeats error; in two Illinois State Bar
Association opinions. See Brickman & Klein, supra note 2, at 1086-87 (criticizing Illinois State
Bar Ass'n Op. 703 (1980) for opining that a lawyer can deposit an advance fee to her own operat-
ing account but if a fee dispute arises she must keep the funds in the client trust account; if the
funds were already in the operating account, no guidance is given); id. at 1087-88 (criticizing
Illinois State Bar Ass'n Op. 722 (1981)). "In short, according to the Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion, nonrefundable retainers are refundable." Id.
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yers or law firms involved in making any such effort shall have
violated this Rule.
* See DR 9-102.
Like many rules, this text uses terms that are intended to have special-
ized meanings. Although we believe that readers of this Article would rec-
ognize those terms and understand their intended meanings and purposes,
we also recognize that not all persons who may come to read this proposed
rule or any version of it will do so. We therefore suggest that the rule be
accompanied by the following brief comments that attempt to clarify the
intended purpose of the rule and the meaning of its specialized terms. The
comments below include a statement indicating that the jurisdiction adopt-
ing the rule has also adopted the presumption advocated in Part IV and
suggests appropriate citations that may be helpful to its users.
This rule addresses fees paid by or on behalf of a client to a
lawyer or law firm in advance of legal services to be rendered. Its
purpose is to protect the client discharge right recognized in this
jurisdiction in [insert name of applicable case in the adopting ju-
risdiction from footnote 24 above]; see also Martin v. Camp, 114
N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916). To that end, it prohibits any attempt by a
lawyer or law firm to retain any such advance fee payment if the
services are not rendered, whether because of discharge, with-
drawal or otherwise, and whether denominated as a nonrefund-
able fee, a minimum fee, a general retainer or otherwise. See In
re Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 1993).
The phrase "specified services to be provided in a specified
matter" denotes a "special retainer" agreement. Special retainer
agreements are to be distinguished from "general retainer" agree-
ments. General retainer agreements are narrowly tailored agree-
ments providing exclusively for a lawyer or law firnm to be
available to render services over a specified period of time. See
Greenberg v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 129 N.E. 211 (N.Y.
1920). Special retainer agreements provide for the performance
of specific legal services for a fee, which may be fixed, contin-
gent, a percentage, or computed on an hourly basis. Because the
distinction between general retainer agreements and special re-
tainer agreements is sometimes difficult to draw, and in order to
protect the interests of clients, all retainer agreements are rebut-
tably presumed to be special retainer agreements and covered by
this rule.
The phrase "earned through the rendering of such services"
denotes the competent performance of the activity for which the
client (or such other person on his behalf) paid the lawyer or law
firm the advance fee.
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B. Revitalization of Martin v. Camp
The importance of Cooperman's revitalization of Martin v. Camp'45
cannot be overstated. The client discharge rule of Martin is a fundamental
corollary of the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship. As
such, it applies to virtually every issue that arises in the field of attor-
ney-client relationships. Indeed, it applies to every situation where attor-
neys' fees are at stake. In the nonrefundable retainer context the
importance is clear, and despite the hue and cry Cooperman has spawned,
the analysis is perfectly straightforward. A client who must forfeit property
to discharge her lawyer has no free discharge fight. Hence, nonrefundable
retainers must be prohibited.
In other fee contexts, the importance of the client discharge right has
been more deeply obscured. The resurrection of Martin in Cooperman
holds the promise of piercing those virulent veneers as well. We will con-
sider two such contexts briefly: safeguarding advance fee payments and the
compensation of a discharged contingent fee lawyer.
1. Safeguarding Advance Fee Payments
In addition to declaring nonrefundable retainers unethical, the text of
the foregoing proposed rule directs that advance fees shall be deposited to
the client trust account (rather than to the lawyer's office or operating ac-
count). Because these issues are closely intertwined,'46 it is appropriate to
consider how Cooperman itself bears on the issue of whether advance fee
payments are to be deposited to the client trust account or to the lawyer's
operating account.
Although the issue is highly controversial, a majority of bar associa-
tion ethics committees have opined that advance fee payments are to be
deposited to the client trust account. 147 Because Cooperman holds that ad-
vance fee payments may not be denominated as nonrefundable and because
DR 2-1 10(A)(3) provides that "a lawyer who withdraws from employment
shall refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been
earned,"' 48 it follows that advance fees are client funds. 14 9 DR 9-102 pro-
vides that client funds paid to a lawyer must be deposited to the client trust
145. 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916).
146. See generally Bricknan, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma, supra note 62 (noting that
nonrefundable retainers implicate the issue of where advance fees are deposited).
147. See id. at 650 n.20, 654 nn.47-48.
148. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REs'oNsImrry DR 2-110(A)(3) (1991). Model Rule
1.16(d) is substantially similar.
149. See In re Gustafson, 493 N.W.2d 551, 553-54 (Minn. 1992) (stating that advance fee
payments are client funds and must be deposited in client trust account until earned and cannot be
withdrawn except upon written notice to client).
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account. 150 Cooperman leads logically, but not inexorably, to the conclu-
sion that advance fee payments must be deposited to the client trust account
and held there until earned by the lawyer (or returned to the client).1 51
Two additional arguments buttress this contention. First, empirical
data on the causes of lawyer defalcation indicates that the failure to return
unearned advance fees constitutes a major disciplinary problem and gener-
ates substantial claims by clients against client protection funds.152 Clients
often are unable to obtain the return of unearned advance fee payments
because their lawyers have either spent the money or otherwise made it
unavailable to the client.' 53 A rule mandating that advance fees be depos-
ited to the client trust account would reduce both the volume of litigation
that clients pursue against lawyers for refunds of advance fee payments as
well as the number of client claims against lawyers that are paid through
client protection funds, in each case saving substantial sums of money.
Second, such a rule would effectuate the intent of DR 9-102(A)(2),
which allows the client to contest the amount of a lawyer's fee when funds
deposited to the security account include fees claimed by the attorney.
1 54
Once the client exercises her right to contest the fee, the funds may not be
withdrawn until the dispute is resolved. 55 Both nonrefundable retainers
150. Model Rule 1.15 is substantially similar.
151. It is still possible to argue that even though advance fee payments are client funds, they
are nonetheless to be deposited to the lawyer's general office account. Essentially, this is the
position adopted in New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 570 (1985).
The senior author has characterized this position as indefensible from textual, legal, fiduciary, and
policy perspectives. See Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma, supra note 62, at
654-73.
152. Client protection funds are operated in 49 states (as well as the District of Columbia,
several common law nations and the Canadian provinces), Frederick Miller, When You Can't
Trust Your Lawyer, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 785, 791 (1990), and are typically funded primarily
through a portion of the annual dues paid by members of each state's bar association. Cf. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsiBLIY EC 9-7 (1992) ("[C]ontribution to a client's security
fund is an acceptable method of meeting [a] lawyer's obligation ... to participate in collective
efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of the misap-
propriation or defalcation of another lawyer.").
In New York State during the period from and including 1982 through and including 1992,
client losses due to unearned legal fees being withheld constituted the single largest class of
claims (1,237 claims, or 27% of all claims), amounting to 4% of all losses on a dollar basis
($4,975,000 for the period). LAWYERS' FuND FOR CLIENT PROTECTION OF TIE STATE OF NEW
YORK, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 25 (1993). During 1992 alone, 144 such claims were made, consti-
tuting 23% of all claims and 1% of all losses, and amounting to $368,000. Id. In New York State
in each of 1985, 1986, and 1987, the single largest class of claims filed with the Clients' Security
Fund of New York (the earlier name of the fund) involved attorneys who kept unearned legal fees.
THE CLuaiTs' SECURITY FuND OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1988);
1986 ANNuAL REPORT 13 (1987); 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1986).
153. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Banks, 847 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Ky. 1993).
154. Model Rule 1.15(c) is substantially similar.
155. In re Stmad, 491 N.W.2d 479, 480 (Wis. 1992) (stating that a lawyer may withdraw a
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and depositing advance fees to the lawyer's office account effectively cir-
cumvent this valuable client protection, and therefore both must be
forbidden.
2. Compensation of Discharged Contingent Fee Attorneys
In the contingent fee context, authorities are divided as to whether the
contingent fee contract percentage establishes a cap on the discharged attor-
ney's recovery. In other words, is the discharged attorney limited to the
percentage of the underlying recovery set by her contract fee (and therefore
a zero recovery if the client recovers nothing in the underlying action)?
Jurisdictions that limit the discharged lawyer's quantum meruit recovery to
the contract price fully effectuate the client discharge rule. 156 However,
jurisdictions that allow the discharged contingent fee attorney to sue in
quantum meruit without limitation (thereby deeming the realization of the
contingency and the amount actually recovered by the client as irrelevant to
the fee computation) severely depreciate the client discharge rule.1 57 Re-
quiring the client who discharges a contingent fee attorney to pay an attor-
ney's fee even if the underlying action is unsuccessful penalizes the client
for discharging the lawyer. Had he not discharged the lawyer (presumably
to hire a second one) and the outcome was a defendant's verdict, he would
not have owed the first attorney any fee. Had the action succeeded, the fee
would have come out of the proceeds gained. Thus, the only time a client is
liable for an out-of-pocket fee expense is when he discharges the attorney in
a jurisdiction that has adopted a distorted version of Martin v. Camp.'
In the nonrefundable retainer context, Cooperman goes far to under-
score the importance of the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relation-
ship and the need for an inviolate client discharge right. Many jurisdictions
are bound to follow Cooperman, just as they followed Martin.'59 When
they do so, they will not only protect clients against the corrosive effects of
nonrefundable retainers, they are also likely to extend the pure client dis-
portion of client funds held in trust once they are earned, unless the client disputes that the lawyer
has earned such funds, in which case the disputed portion may not be withdrawn).
156. See authorities cited in Brickman, Setting the Fee, supra note 24, at 380 nn.67-75.
157. See authorities cited in Brickman, Setting the Fee, supra note 24, at 382 nn.76-78. See
also Irving Cohen, Note, For a Few Dollars More: Client's Right to Discharge His Attorney
Under a Contingent Fee Contract, 7 CARoozo L. Rv. 913, 924-33 (1986) (comparing results
across jurisdictions and proposing an alternative rule designed to avoid duplicative and excessive
fees).
158. Ironically, New York, the originator of Martin v. Camp and Cooperman, also has
adopted the distorted version of the client discharge rule as applied to contingent fees. Brickman,
Setting the Fee, supra note 24, at 382-85.
159. See supra note 24.
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charge rule to other contexts in which attorneys have been committing fee
abuses.
VI. CONCLUSION
We applaud the Cooperman decision. We believe it properly con-
demns as unethical a retainer agreement that, because it includes a
nonrefundable fee provision, interferes with a client's right to discharge her
attorney with or without cause, at any time, without penalty. We urge
courts to take the additional step, in one proceeding, of requiring lawyers to
make restitution of unearned funds obtained through unethical means.
Moreover, we believe it is necessary that courts reviewing the validity of
retainer agreements impose a presumption that a retainer fee agreement
constitutes a special retainer, rather than a general retainer, to protect
against the risk that lawyers will seek to construct artificial general retainers
in an attempt to avoid the consequences of the Cooperman decision. Fi-
nally, we believe that it is desirable to promulgate a rule specifying that
nonrefundable retainers are impermissible as a matter of legal ethics.
160
That rule should expressly address the related issue concerning safeguard-
ing advance fee payments by requiring such fees to be deposited and held in
the client trust account until such time as they are earned by the attorney
and become his property through the rendering of compensable services.
160. We also continue to believe that nonrefundable retainers are impermissible as a matter of
civil law (in addition to being unethical). See Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 4, at 170-89;
see also Joel R. Brandes, P.C. v. Zingmond, 573 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (holding
nonrefundable retainers unenforceable as a matter of contract law). It may therefore also be ap-
propriate to adopt a statute specifying that such agreements are unenforceable as a matter of civil
law as well. There is less urgent need for such a step in the civil area, however, since denominat-
ing nonrefundable retainers as unethical very likely renders them void and unenforceable as a
matter of public policy. Hegeman-Harris Co. v. Town of Greenburgh, N.Y. L.L, Mar. 25, 1993, at
34 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (citing and following Cooperman to set aside a nonrefundable retainer as
"illegal and void").
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APPENDIX A
1. Retainer Agreement, dated August 18, 1986 (the subject of disciplinary
charges 1-5).
2. Letter from Client under Agreement 1, dated September 23, 1986 (the
subject of disciplinary charge 4).
3. Retainer Agreement, dated November 18, 1987 (the subject of discipli-
nary charges 6-10).
4. Letter from Client under Agreement 3, dated January 18, 1988 (the
subject of disciplinary charge 9).
5. Retainer Agreement, undated (but entered into on or around November
1, 1988) (the subject of disciplinary charges 11-15).







Re: People v. [Client]
Dear [Clients]:
This letter will constitute our agreement of retainer when signed by all
of us, for my representation of [Client] in the above [name of County]
criminal matter, which presently charges [Client] with [charge].
My minimum fee for appearing for you in this matter is Fifteen Thou-
sand ($15,000.00) Dollars. This fee is not refundable for any reason what-
soever once I file a notice of appearance on your behalf. It is deemed to be
owed in full at that time even if not so paid in full by that time, whether or
not you choose to continue with my services to any stage in the proceedings
or you discharge me during the pendency of the case at any point. You are
paying a portion of this fee today ($1,000.00), which will be deemed to
apply to the conferences we have had to date and a letter to be given to you
for presentation to the presiding judge in the County Court tomorrow indi-
cating that I have been consulted by you for the purpose of being retained,
and requesting an adjournment of the matter until [date], by which time
you agree to pay me an additional Nine Thousand ($9,000.00) dollars to-
wards the balance of the retainer. The remaining Five Thousand ($5,000.00)
dollars shall be paid One thousand ($1,000.00) per month on the 16th day
or each month, commencing the 16th of October until paid in full.
You have told me that you have already waived your right to be prose-
cuted by indictment and have plead guilty to a felony (I am informed that it
is an "attempt" to commit the crime charged and the minimum sentence
promised you is 1 1/2 to 3 years), I shall attempt to vacate this waiver and
plea and attempt to proceed in this matter from the "beginning". We have
discussed the possibility of having you testify before the Grand Jury and
various post-indictment and pre-trial motions to dismiss the case and/or to
suppress your purported "confession". I intend to take whatever steps are
necessary to protect your interests in this matter, and have advised you to
retain the services of a private investigator. I have recommended [private
(Vol. 72
NONREFUNDABLE RETAINERS
investigator] of [town], with whom I have worked with [sic] successfully
on numerous occasions and in whom I repose a great deal of trust and
respect.
The initial retainer will be sufficient to pay for any proceedings re-
quired up to and including the Grand Jury. For your protection, and as we
have discussed, it is not a usual occurrence for a defendant to testify at the
Grand Jury, partly for the reason of testifying "against" one's self and partly
for the reason that the prosecution may use this testimony against you at
your trial even if you choose not to testify at the trial itself. Pending my
personal familiarization with the facts of this case, and the independent pri-
vate investigation, I shall not advise you to testify thereat, but it will be
considered and may be recommended. In the event our application to with-
draw the waiver of prosecution by indictment and the plea of guilty to the
[court] is denied, the initial retainer will cover the motion and an appeal to
the Appellate Division, if necessary, but will not include any out-of-pocket
expenses, including extra-ordinary travel, or disbursements, such as investi-
gation fees, filing and subpoena or process service fees, minutes of court
proceedings, messenger fees, printing of the brief and record on appeal, or
extra-ordinary office disbursements or expenses beyond occasional photo-
copying and regular postage (not certified, registered or Express Mail), etc.
This will apply throughout our association, in my representation of you on
any matter. You agree to pay me these expenses or disbursements within
ten days of my sending you an itemized bill for same.
Should [client] be indicted by the Grand Jury, my fee will be an addi-
tional Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) dollars, payable prior to my appearing in
the County Court for his arraignment. If an appeal is necessary due to a
denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment, an additional Five Thousand
($5,000.00) dollars will be paid at the time the Notice of Appeal is filed
therefor. In the event the appeal is denied, or a trial is required without an
appeal, an additional Five Thousand ($5,000.00) dollars will be required
prior to the commencement of trial.
You have been informed during our numerous conversations, that
while I will exercise good professional judgment and efforts on [client's]
behalf, no promises or guarantees as to the final results of this case or any
part thereof can be or are made to any degree.
In the event that you fail to pay me ANY of the above retainers or fees
recited within ten days of my request therefor, it shall then be deemed that
you have decided to terminate me from the case immediately, and consent
to the entry of a Court Order relieving me as your attorney in the case or
any part thereof, in any court in which I may be representing you. If a bill
for the printing of the record and briefs on any appeal is presented to you
and not paid within ten days, you authorize me not to perfect the appeal
1993]
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(have the record and briefs printed and filed with the court and served upon
the District Attorney). In the event you you [sic] so fail to pay me as
above, you further consent to my discontinuing any and all work on your
behalf without notice, and relieve me of any and all liability to you therefor.
Notwithstanding your failure to pay me any instalment or payment that is
due to me under the terms of this agreement, you will continue to owe me
that sum or total of money which you may not have paid up to the date of
my discharge as your attorney, even after my discharge.
There are no other promises or terms of our agreement than those con-
tained herein.
By signing this agreement in the place indicated below, you are con-
senting to it, and both of you agree to remain personally obligated and
















Garden City, N.Y. 11530
Dear Ed,
Please let this letter serve as notice to stop working on [my husband's]
case.
You told us that you could help us and we trusted you. We gave you
$10,000 in cash which was all the money we had. You said you could keep
[my husband] out of prison & that there wasn't a thing to worry about.
You told him to just go about his business, do his [work] & assured us you
would resolve his legal problem to our satisfaction. [There follows a list of
several specific actions or inactions by Mr. Cooperman which led the cli-
ents to lose trust and confidence in the lawyer.]
[My husband] and I then realized that we gave you all this money up
front & you weren't giving us your all.
I feel we deserve a refund on this. Please call me to discuss this. I'm
left here with no money and no husband to make up the money that was
given to you. You assured us he would be home to earn a living & to earn
the $1,000 a month to you [sic].











Re: Retainer - Matter of Estate of [Client]
Dear [Client]:
This letter will confirm our agreement for your retaining the services
of my office to represent you in a probate matter concerning the estate of
your father, [client's father], who died in the [name of State] on [date].
You have informed me that following the death of your mother, your
father remarried [name], and, in a purported will dated [date], left every-
thing to her, thus effectively disinheriting yourself and your brother. By a
prior will dated [earlier], during the lifetime of your mother, the entire
estate was to be shared between your brother and yourself. I have informed
you that although I am not admitted to practice in the [name of State],
where the laws are different than in New York, I have in the past been
admitted "pro haec [sic] vice", which means for one particular case only.
It is my intention to become admitted for this case pro haec [sic] vice, to
investigate the circumstances of the execution of this [second] will, and to
retain local counsel in [other state] to advise me and appear for me at times
that it is not economically practical for you to have me appear in any court
proceeding. It will be my intention to appear for actual adversary proceed-
ings such as hearings or trials when my presence is beneficial to our cause.
The object of my retainer is to have the [second] will invalidated and to
reinstate the [earlier] will, wherein you will receive a substantial share of
the estate.
This agreement will set forth the terms of my retainer in an effort to
obtain this result or to settle this case on terms acceptable to you.
For the MINIMUM FEE and NON-REFUNDABLE amount of Five
thousand ($5,000.00) dollars, I will act as your counsel to acquire any and
all information and to render a professional opinion that will be crucial to
your forming your own opinion whether to pursue a court proceeding to
actually file papers to invalidate the [earlier] will. This agreement is not
for a time retainer which can possibly result in a higher amount than that
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agreed to be paid. The fees in our arrangement are fixed. For the initial
retainer, I shall ascertain all or as much as possible of the salient and perti-
nent facts of this matter that would enable us both to understand the truth of
the entire matter. A private investigation is imperative. A background in-
vestigation of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will(s)
and a private investigator's interview with the witnesses must be done, if
possible. An investigation by the private investigator as to the extent and
location of any assets of the estate, together with an investigation of the
depletion of any of the assets of the estate by [the second wife] is advisable
and will be requested. This is the minimum fee no matter how much or
how little work I do in this investigatory stage (as you are aware I can
counsel you and answer your questions and be the liaison between the in-
vestigator and the court and yourself, but my efforts are dependent upon the
cooperation of others), and will remain the minimum fee and not refundable
[sic] even if you decide prior to my completion of the investigation that
you wish to discontinue the use of my services for any reason whatsoever,
or to discontinue the investigation for any reason whatsoever. If you so
decide, following my rendering this opinion to you that such is feasible and/
or advisable, then in that event, my retainer will be Fifteen thousand
($15,000.00) dollars to commence any such proceeding or to file any papers
to accomplish this result. The latter amount will be less the Five thousand
($5,000.00) dollars previously paid on account of legal services. The Fif-
teen thousand ($15,000.00) dollars is my NIMVIUM FEE for this matter,
and is NOT REFUNDABLE under any circumstances, even if you decide
to terminate my services or to discontinue the case for any reason whoso-
ever. My actual fee for this case will be a sum equal to one-third of the
gross proceeds obtained by suit, settlement or otherwise, less any amounts
paid to me on account of legal fees (e.g., the $15,000.00 minimum fee
aforementioned). Any amounts you have paid on account of expenses or
disbursements will be deducted from the gross settlement and repaid to you,
and then you and I shall share our respective one-third and two-third shares
of the remainder. I shall pay any local [other state] attorney who works for
us in this matter and you shall pay the investigator who I retain for us to
investigate the facts and circumstances in this matter, either directly or by
reimbursing me following my rendering you a statement for his services
which I may have previously paid.
You have been informed that I may have a lawyer-associate affiliated
with my office work with me in the prosecution of this case, within my
discretion or during times when work on your behalf is required to be done
and I am unavailable due to engagement in a different county or court or for
other reasons. You consent to this.
You shall be obligated to pay any and all reasonable expenses and
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disbursements incurred by my office in this matter or on your behalf, in-
cluding but not limited to service of process fees, filing fees, investigation
fees, calendar service fees, photocopies, postage, telephone charges other
than local telephone calls, cost of transcripts, official court documents, sten-
ographic minutes when required for your benefit, etc., and any other reason-
able expenses or disbursements on your behalf, including travel expenses to
and from [other state], and lodging in the event I am required to be there
overnight. You will pay these items to me or to the business rendering its
bill to me or directly to yourself for same within ten days of the date you
are billed for such expense or disbursement, and you will be consulted for
your approval prior to the incurring of any of these expenses.
Aside from exercising reasonable professional efforts to obtain the best
possible result for you, no promises or guarantees have been made to you as
to the potential results of this case.
There are no other representations other than what ate made herein,
and the foregoing constitutes the entire agreement between us.
This agreement cannot be changed orally, only by another subsequent
written agreement.
By signing this letter of retainer, you are agreeing to the foregoing. If
you agree with the terms of my employment for you, please sign in the














Garden City, NY 11530
Dear Mr. Cooperman:
The purpose of this letter is to notify you that as of this date I have
terminated your services. Please return the retainer I paid you, less the
value of any services you rendered and any expenses you incurred to date.
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5.
[handwritten]
Retainer agreement between [Clients] and Edward M. Cooperman, Esq. to
retain Mr. Cooperman's services to represent their son [name] re: a felony
involving the alleged [crime].
The MINIMUM FEE for Mr. Cooperman's representation of [the son]
to any extent whatsoever is TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) dollars. This
fee will be paid FIVE THOUSAND ($5,000.00) dollars today and FIVE
THOUSAND ($5,000.00) on or before December 1, 1988.
The above amount is the minimum fee and will remain the minimum
fee no matter how few court appearances are made by Mr. Cooperman.
This fee will also cover, if required, whatever court appearances are re-
quired to complete this matter without a trial or any hearings that involve
the taking of testimony, following indictment. The minimum fee will re-
main the same even if Mr. Cooperman is discharged.
In the event any pre-trial hearings are required, or a trial is held, there
is an additional fee of TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) dollars, payable
prior to the commencement of any hearings and if no hearing, prior to the
trial, whichever is first.
[The clients] have been advised that it is to the best interests of their
son to retain the services of a private investigator so as to have the best
possible preparation for the defense of their son. They agree to be responsi-
ble for these expenses and for any services of subpoenas or court processes
for the benefit of their son that Mr. Cooperman shall require. This will also
apply to any experts and expert testimony.
[The clients] have been advised that the underlying charge is quite
serious and that no matter what efforts Mr. Cooperman exerts on their son's
behalf, he still may have to face a prison term. Mr. Cooperman has ex-
plained to them that it is both unethical and illegal for a lawyer to guarantee
anything to his clients and that, accordingly, no promises or guarantees are
made as to any potential result in this case.
The above agreement represents the entire understanding between the
[clients] and Mr. Cooperman and cannot be changed except by another
written agreement.
/s/[Client] /s/Edward M. Cooperman
[CLIENT] EDWARD M. COOPERMAN
/s/[Client]
[CLIENT]
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